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Testimony of the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs

**Before the
House Committee on Culture & Arts
Wednesday, March 18, 2026
10:30 a.m.
Via Videoconference
Conference Room 309**

**On the following measure:
S.B. 3019, S.D. 2, RELATING TO CONSUMER PROTECTION**

Chair Kapela and Members of the Committee:

My name is Emma Olsen, and I am an Enforcement Attorney for the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs' (Department) Office of Consumer Protection (OCP). While the Department appreciates the intent of this bill, we respectfully oppose the price cap this bill imposes on ticket resellers, as it could lead to unintended and severe negative consequences.

This addresses the impact of ticket scalpers on Hawai'i residents by prohibiting tickets from being sold at a price higher than \$3 more than the original price charged by the primary venue ticket provider.

We recognize that Hawai'i consumers pay higher prices to ticket resellers than the original ticket price set by the primary venue when demand for the tickets exceeds supply. The restricted supply of tickets from primary ticket issuers is not unique to Hawai'i. Without policy interventions, a similar phenomenon exists wherever demand for a

commodity or service outstrips supply: consumers pay a higher price. With live event tickets, supply from the primary ticket sellers is limited by the venue's seating capacity.

Strict caps on resale prices may unintentionally push ticket sales into less transparent and less secure channels. When resale activity moves away from established platforms that provide transaction records, refund policies, and payment protections, consumers face greater risks of fraud, non-delivery, and scams. Informal peer-to-peer exchanges, social media transactions, and cash-based sales may be significantly more difficult to regulate and enforce than sales through a platform that provides rules and safeguards for buyers and sellers.

A February 2026 report from the Progressive Policy Institute raises concerns about resale price caps from a competition and consumer-welfare perspective.¹ The report suggests that resale caps may significantly shrink the legitimate resale market, reduce consumer choice and weaken competitive pressure on primary ticket sellers.

Consumer frustration about high ticket prices for live events is apparent from testimony on this measure; however, the policies to address high ticket prices should be tailored. A price cap is not a tailored approach. Policies such as requiring all-in fee transparency, prohibiting speculative ticket sales, and strengthening bans on bot usage would directly address unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the secondary market without imposing unduly punitive measures on legitimate resellers. These alternative policy approaches could improve the consumer experience in the ticket re-sale market without driving consumers toward riskier, unregulated channels.

With regards to bot activity, federal law ² and the laws of several states specifically prohibit the use of automated ticket-purchasing bots. These states include Connecticut,

¹ Diana Moss, State Regulation of the Resale Ticket Market (Feb. 23, 2026), Progressive Policy Institute, <https://www.progressivepolicy.org/state-regulation-of-the-resale-ticket-market/>.

² Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, 15 U.S.C. section 45c. The Act prohibits the circumvention of a security measure, access control system, or other technological control measure used online by a ticket issuer. The Act also prohibits selling or offering to sell an event ticket obtained through such a circumvention violation if the seller participated in, had the ability to control, or should have known about the violation. The

New York, California, and Tennessee.³ Perceived benefits of enacting state law prohibitions include facilitating enforcement by state authorities in state courts and avoiding over-reliance on federal enforcement and intervention.

Under Connecticut law, no person may use “automated ticket purchasing software” to buy tickets on an internet website offering tickets for entertainment events.⁴ “Automated ticketing software” means “a device, computer program or computer software that enables the automated purchase of tickets to entertainment events by bypassing or rendering inoperable security measures on an Internet web site offering the sale of tickets.” Violating this prohibition is deemed an “unfair or deceptive act or practice” in trade or commerce and can lead to enforcement actions by the Connecticut Attorney General, civil penalties, injunctions, and private actions by affected consumers.

With respect to price transparency, our office strongly supports S.B. 2031, S.D. 2, which will prohibit unfair or deceptive pricing practices by ticket issuing venues and resellers. While we appreciate the intent, we respectfully request that this measure be held in Committee. We have previously pledged to work with affected stakeholders to explore policy solutions. We would appreciate their insights and believe they would benefit from ours.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this bill.

Act applies to event tickets for public concerts, theater performances, sporting events, and similar activities at venues with seating capacity of over 200.

In 2021, the FTC brought three cases against ticket brokers it claimed violated the BOTS Act by using (1) automated ticket-buying software to search for and reserve tickets automatically, (2) software to conceal their IP addresses, and (3) hundreds of fictitious Ticketmaster accounts and credit cards to get around posted event ticket limits. To resolve the FTC’s allegations, these companies agreed to orders requiring them to pay \$3.7 million in civil penalties. [BOTS Act compliance: Time for a refresher? | Federal Trade Commission](#) (last visited 3/16/2026).

³ New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law section 25.24; California Business & Professions Code section 22505.5; Tennessee Code Annotate section 39-17-1104. The California law provides that it is unlawful to interfere with systems that ensure an equitable ticket-buying process, including limits on ticket quantities, and it includes bots that bypass CAPTCHA or authentication, circumvent purchasing limits, and automate large-scale ticket purchasing.

⁴ Connecticut General Statutes sec. 53-289e.

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March 13, 2026

The Honorable Jeanne Kapela, Chair
The Honorable Sam Kong, Vice-Chair
and Members of the Committee on Culture and Arts
Hawaii State House of Representatives
415 S. Beretania St., Room 309
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

Aloha Chair Kapela, Vice-Chair Kong, and Members of the Committee:

On behalf of the City and County of Honolulu, which owns and operates multiple live entertainment venues, we appreciate the opportunity to testify in **support** of SB3019, which would establish a cap on the resale price of live event tickets.

Our city operates publicly owned venues that host concerts, family shows, sporting events, and community gatherings. These facilities are financed and maintained with public dollars, and our mission is clear: to provide broad, equitable access to cultural, artistic and civic experiences for our residents while supporting local economic activity.

Unrestricted ticket resale at excessive markups directly undermines our mission.

When tickets to events at our venues are purchased in bulk and immediately relisted at two, three, or even ten times face value, local families are priced out of experiences that were intended to be accessible. Artists and promoters set ticket prices with an understanding of their audience and community. When resellers inflate those prices, the public often blames the venue or the city, eroding trust in our institutions and damaging our reputation.

Importantly, this bill does not eliminate ticket resale. It simply sets reasonable guardrails to prevent predatory pricing and speculative hoarding. A capped resale model balances flexibility for consumers who can no longer attend an event with protections against price gouging.

The Honorable Jeanne Kapela, Chair
The Honorable Sam Kong, Vice-Chair
and Members of the Committee on Culture and Arts
March 13, 2026
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Mahalo for the opportunity to provide testimony. Should there be any questions, please contact me, at 808-768-6608 or via email at anthony.miranda@honolulu.gov.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Anthony Miranda', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Anthony Miranda
Legislative Liaison, Office of the Mayor



HAWAI'I
SYMPHONY
ORCHESTRA

DANE LAM | MUSIC AND ARTISTIC DIRECTOR

Thirty-Third Legislature, State of Hawai'i
Regular Session of 2026
House Committee on Culture and Arts
Testimony by Hawai'i Symphony Orchestra
March 18, 2026

TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF SB3019 SD2
- RELATING TO CONSUMER PROTECTION

Aloha Chair Kapela, Vice Chair Kong, and Members of the Committee,

As Music and Artistic Director and President and CEO, respectively, of the Hawaii Symphony Orchestra, and we write in strong support of **SB3019 SD2**, which addresses the growing problem of ticket scalping in Hawai'i. Popular events in our state continue to attract automated bulk purchasing by scalpers, which drives up resale prices and makes it harder for local residents to access concerts, cultural events, and community gatherings.

Importantly, **the inflated amounts charged by scalpers do not benefit the performers, event organizers, or venues in any way.** When tickets are resold at drastically higher prices, all additional profits go solely to third-party scalpers, not to the artists or organizations that create the event. SB3019 protects consumers while also ensuring that event revenue flows where it is intended—not into the pockets of automated resellers who exploit the system.

By supporting **SB3019 SD2**, the Legislature helps ensure that Hawai'i residents—not scalpers—have equitable access to events they value.

Mahalo for your time and consideration.

Dane Lam
Music and Artistic Director

Amy Iwano
President and CEO



March 18, 2026

The Honorable Jeanne Kapela
Chair
Committee on Culture and Arts
Room 418, State Capitol
415 South Beretania Street
Honolulu, HI 96813

RE: Oppose SB 3019 - Price Caps

Dear Chair Kapela and members of the committee,

On behalf of Chamber of Progress, a tech industry association supporting public policies to build a society in which all people benefit from technological advances, **I respectfully urge you to oppose SB 3019**, which would prohibit the resale of event tickets at prices above the original price charged by the primary venue ticket provider, effectively entrenching dominant primary ticketing platforms, limiting consumer choice, and reducing competition in secondary ticket markets.

Some online ticket marketplaces—like Ticketmaster and its parent company, Live Nation Events—enjoy a unique position as the event presenter, original ticket seller and reseller; a role that places them in a position similar to competing ticket resellers. Consequently, these multi-role marketplaces expose consumers to comparable challenges and issues encountered by their resale competitors, a situation that has garnered significant attention and even prompted an antitrust lawsuit from the Department of Justice (DOJ).¹

Price caps are ineffective and will drive ticket resales to underground and unregulated channels

Price caps, or restrictions placed on the resale price of a ticket included in Section 3 of the bill, are arbitrary and ineffective. A 2018 report by the US Government Accountability

¹ *Complaint against Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. and Ticketmaster LLC (Case No. 1:24-cv-3973)*. U.S. Department of Justice, Mar. 23, 2024. (The complaint has been brought forth by the United States and a coalition of states, including Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia Wisconsin, and Wyoming.)
<https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1353101/dl>

Office highlights the difficulty in enforcing these caps, making them largely unsuccessful.² The report also references a study by the New York Department of State, which found “no definitive evidence that price caps impacted the availability of tickets for resale or resulted in lower resale prices.”³

For instance, in June 2023, the resale restrictions for Taylor Swift’s Eras Tour in Australia highlighted how price caps drove fans to unverified websites and social media platforms, exposing them to scams and fraud. Police reports showed that over \$260,000 was lost to scams related to counterfeit tickets for just one tour.⁴ Fans who sought alternative channels were left without recourse when their tickets turned out to be fake, demonstrating how price caps can drive transactions into untrustworthy environments where consumer protections are nonexistent.

Additionally, the value of a ticket should be what a consumer places on it. At the core of consumer rights is the freedom to enjoy and utilize their purchased property as the consumer deems fit, including the right and ability to resell that property. For example, season ticket holders can sell their tickets to sports games they can’t attend or if their team isn’t doing well. If their team is playing a premium opponent, the resale of the ticket helps offset the costs of increasingly expensive season ticket packages.

Conditioning lawful resale above face value on prior authorization from an event operator is fundamentally flawed. In practice, that authorization is almost always controlled by dominant incumbents such as Live Nation and its ticketing subsidiary Ticketmaster, giving them gatekeeping power over who may participate in the resale market and at what price. Rather than protecting consumers, this structure entrenches market concentration, limits competition from independent resellers, and incentivizes transactions to move outside regulated marketplaces where transparency, fraud prevention, and consumer protections are weakest.

For these reasons, **I respectfully urge you to oppose SB 3019.**

Sincerely,

² *Event Ticket Sales Market Characteristics and Consumer Protection Issues*. US Government Accountability Office, Apr. 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-347.pdf>

³ *Id.* at p. 41

⁴ Amy Roulston. “Victorian fans lose almost \$300,000 in scams ahead of Taylor Swift Eras Tour as MCG issues warning for ticketless fans.” Australia News, Feb. 7, 2024. <https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/crime/victorian-fans-lose-almost-300000-in-scams-ahead-of-taylor-swift-eras-tour-as-mcg-issues-warning-for-ticketless-fans/news-story/455223459481ef816a49f9382281bb81>

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Robert Singleton', with a stylized, cursive script.

Robert Singleton

Senior Director of Policy and Public Affairs, California and US West



Chair Keohokalole, Vice Chair Fukunaga, and Members of the Committee,

My name is Kendall Gilvar, and I write on behalf of the [National Independent Venue Association](#) (NIVA) and the [Fix the Tix Coalition](#) in strong support of SB3019, which would ban the resale of live event tickets above face value in Hawaii.

NIVA is the national trade association representing thousands of independent live entertainment venues, festivals, promoters, performing arts centers, and nonprofit stages across the country, including dozens across Hawaii. The Fix the Tix Coalition, which NIVA leads, is a broad alliance of live event organizations advocating for a fairer ticketing system. Our coalition includes venues, promoters, performing arts organizations, artist groups, recorded music partners, and independent ticketing companies who take on the financial risk to bring live events to communities. Partners include Universal Music Group, the Recording Academy, SAG-AFTRA, and many others.

We support SB3019 because resale price caps are a straightforward and effective consumer protection that restores fairness to the live entertainment marketplace.

The Problem: A Broken Secondary Ticketing Market

Fans expect a fair opportunity to purchase tickets at face value. Instead, they increasingly encounter a marketplace distorted by bulk purchasing technology and automated software that acquires large quantities of tickets and immediately relists them at extreme markups.

Shows sell out in minutes. Moments later, the same tickets reappear on resale platforms at two, three, or even five times their original price. Families who did everything right are forced into the secondary market and asked to pay far more than the artist or venue ever intended. This is not a free and competitive market. It is a manipulated one. Price gouging adds to the burden on working families already struggling with rising costs for housing, groceries, utilities, gas, and healthcare. Live entertainment, which should be accessible and community-based, is increasingly becoming a luxury product available only to the highest bidder.

The Harm to Hawaii's Local Economy

According to [Hawaii's 2025 State of Live Report](#), independent live entertainment stages in Hawaii drive:

- \$190.2 million in state GDP
- \$368.6 million in total economic output
- \$18.3 million in tax revenue

- \$116.7 million in wages
- \$13.1 million in off-site tourism spending

Independent venues are not just cultural anchors. They are economic engines. At the same time, 64 percent of independent venues nationwide are operating without profitability. Many are still in a fragile position.

When tickets are resold at extreme markups by third-party scalpers, that revenue does not circulate through Hawaii's local economy. It does not go to the venue staff, the artists, or the local businesses that rely on show nights. Instead, it is siphoned off by resale marketplaces and professional scalpers, many of whom are headquartered out of state and operate at scale. SB3019 ensures that value created by Hawaii's cultural economy remains connected to Hawaii's communities.

Why Resale Price Caps Work

Bots and bulk buying exist because there is extraordinary financial incentive to resell tickets at unlimited markups. When tickets can be flipped for massive profits, automated purchasing software becomes a lucrative business model. If resale is limited to a reasonable margin, that financial incentive is dramatically reduced. We have heard this directly from venues in states that have already passed resale price caps.

Other jurisdictions are moving in this direction. Maine has capped resale prices at no more than 10 percent above the original total ticket cost. Legislatures in states including Delaware, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, West Virginia, Kansas, Vermont and more are advancing similar policies. Internationally, Australia, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and France have adopted strong protections against exploitative resale markups. And, just this week, [members of Congress called for broad resale price caps](#).

Momentum is clear. This is a bipartisan consumer protection issue. Resale price caps are an essential tool to help prevent unethical and anti-consumer practices and to restore balance in a marketplace that has tilted heavily toward speculative profit.

Who Might Oppose This Bill

It is important to be candid. The primary opponents of resale price caps are the large secondary marketplaces and the professional scalpers who populate their platforms. These businesses generate billions of dollars in revenue from high markups and fees. They profit off of consumer confusion and price gouging.

Independent venues, nonprofit performing arts organizations, artists, and fans do not benefit from those markups. The only parties whose business models depend on unlimited and inflated resale prices are the resale platforms themselves.

The Bottom Line

Today's secondary ticketing market in Hawaii is not functioning in a way that serves consumers or local communities. Small businesses and local economies are losing revenue. Families are being priced out. Trust in the live entertainment marketplace is eroding. SB3019 restores fairness, affordability, and integrity to ticket sales in Hawaii. It keeps live entertainment accessible to working Hawaii families and protects the small and independent businesses that form the backbone of Hawaii's cultural and economic life.

For these reasons, NIVA and the Fix the Tix Coalition respectfully urge you to pass SB3019.

Thank you for your consideration.

16 March 2026

House Committee on Culture & the Arts (CAA)
Rep. Jeanné Kapela, Chair
Rep. Sam Satoru Kong, Vice Chair

Testimony in Support of SB3019 – Relating to Consumer Protection

Dear Chair Kapela, Vice Chair Kong, and members of the CAA Committee:

Hawai'i Youth Symphony believes strongly in the importance of equitable access to arts and cultural experiences for all members of our community, in concert with our vision of a Hawai'i where Music Is A Right.

The intent of this measure addresses a persistent barrier that often prevents young people and families from attending concerts, theatre, and other arts & cultural events.

Excessive markups by ticket resellers unfairly reinforce the belief that the music and the arts are for the privileged few who can afford them. When ticket resellers scoop up blocks of tickets, they eliminate opportunities for local families to attend affordably and accessibly. This secondary market also creates untoward confusion among ticket buyers, harming the reputations and relationships that arts organizations like ours work diligently to create and uphold.

Recent concerts, like the one by Studio Ghibli composer Joe Hisaishi, are powerful evidence of the ways that concerts inspire our community and bring people together around the arts.

We also appreciate the language in the bill that would exclude fundraising activities by charitable organizations. HYS and other local organizations often donate tickets for fundraising gals/auctions, and include donated tickets in our own gals/auctions. Removing this exclusion would jeopardize those activities and make it even more challenging to support our services.

Overall, when people have an equitable chance at attending the concerts and activities that local organizations work diligently to provide to our state, our community as a whole stands to benefit.

Thank you for considering this important step toward greater arts access for Hawai'i's youth and families.

Sincerely,



Randy Wong
President & CEO, Hawai'i Youth Symphony



March 17, 2026

Rep. Jeanne Kapela, Chair
Rep. Sam Saturo Kong, Vice Chair
House Committee on Culture & Arts
Hawaii State Capitol
415 South Beretania St.
Honolulu, HI 96813

RE: Senate Bill 3019 (Resale Price Caps) - OPPOSE

Dear Chair Kapela, Vice Chair Kong, & Honorable Members of the Committee:

SeatGeek is proud to be the Official Ticket Marketplace of University of Hawaii Rainbow Warriors athletics. We are a high-growth technology platform transforming the live event experience for fans, teams, and venues. Our enterprise ticketing technology allows teams and venues to efficiently grow their businesses while delivering a superior live experience that all fans deserve; we also provide a leading online resale platform that makes it easy and secure for fans to buy tickets and attend events, such as Rainbow Warrior games, with features such as Deal Score, our proprietary technology that helps fans find the best ticket prices for the best seats using our best-in-class mapping capabilities.

SeatGeek is somewhat unique in that we also compete directly for enterprise-level ticketing contracts against leading primary ticketing service providers (such as Ticketmaster). Our primary ticketing clients include the NFL Dallas Cowboys, NHL Stanley Cup Champion Florida Panthers, NBA Cleveland Cavaliers, and multiple leading professional soccer clubs across the U.S. as well as the UK Premier League.

We recognize that the intent of SB 3019 is to protect local fans and keep live entertainment events affordable, and therefore write with genuine appreciation for the bill sponsors' wish to advance crucial consumer protections for fans purchasing tickets to live concerts and sporting events in Hawaii. However, we respectfully submit that the proposed imposition of resale price caps is in fact harmful to consumers. This has been widely recognized across the United States since the advent of the Internet era. Indeed, **as recently as November 2024, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts moved in the**



opposite direction than SB 3019 proposes, rescinding from the books an over 100-year old resale price cap law that has not been enforced for decades.

When buyers and sellers have the option of a reliable marketplace (like SeatGeek) that allows for live event tickets to be sold at fair market value, fans can trust they are getting a fair price and that there will be consequences for any broken orders. We at SeatGeek are therefore proud of the [Buyer Guarantee](#)¹ that we stand behind for purchases made on our ticketing platform. When such secure marketplaces do not exist, consumers seek alternative black markets which provide none of these protections and often leave buyers with no recourse when a seller fails to deliver as advertised. We strongly recommend a thoughtful piece published in 2024 by the Josiah Bartlett Center for Public Policy in New Hampshire when the New Hampshire State Legislature was considering legislation that would have imposed resale price caps on live event tickets: ['scalping' won't fix the ticket resale market](#).² In the Bartlett Center piece, the author stresses that imposing price controls on ticketing marketplaces would “create shortages in legitimate secondary ticket markets and stimulate a separate black market for event tickets.” Similarly, an analyst from the R Street Institute (a Washington D.C. think tank “committed to classical liberalism, principled pluralism, and a more civil civic culture”) has recently opined that [Price Caps on Secondary Ticket Sales Are Just Bad Policy](#).³

Of course, the opposite is also true: where a transparent and secure market is allowed to operate, live event ticket prices very often plummet in the days leading up to an event. See [The Thrill of the Chase for a \\$9 Cyndi Lauper Ticket; Bargain hunters and even devotees wait it out for the right price to see concerts](#), Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2025;⁴ see also [Beyoncé Cowboy Carter Tickets Hit \\$20 on SeatGeek as Tour Kicks Off In Los Angeles](#), Digital Music News, April 28, 2025,⁵ [Tickets to Paul McCartney's Minneapolis concert are surprisingly cheap](#), Minneapolis Star Tribune, September 26, 2025 (resale sites listing tickets for U.S. Bank Stadium October 17, 2025 concert date “starting around \$35”).⁶

The 2023-24 high-profile Taylor Swift Eras Tour provides multiple real-life examples proving this exact point. In country after country, where the supply of market-priced resale tickets for high-demand events was suppressed by resale price caps or other

¹ <https://seatgeek.com/buyer-guarantee>

² <https://jbartlett.org/2024/03/banning-scalping-wont-fix-the-ticket-resale-market/>, March 2024

³ <https://www.rstreet.org/commentary/price-caps-on-secondary-ticket-sales-are-just-bad-policy/>, R Street Institute, August 7, 2025

⁴ https://www.wsj.com/lifestyle/concert-tickets-cyndi-lauper-taylor-swift-springsteen-cheap-c45eba35?st=y79gm4&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

⁵ <https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2025/04/28/beyonce-cowboy-carter-tickets-low-prices/>

⁶ <https://www.startribune.com/tickets-to-paul-mccartneys-minneapolis-concert-are-surprisingly-cheap/601480890>



restrictions, there inevitably was an ensuing spike in ticket scams and proliferation of consumers being ripped off. For example:

- Canada: Prior to Ms. Swift’s November 2024 Toronto concerts, some 400 fans were ripped off to the tune of approximately \$300,000 after believing they were purchasing Taylor Swift tickets on Facebook but never receiving them. See [Apparent Taylor Swift ticket scam targets hundreds who claim to be out \\$300K](#), CTV News, November 17, 2024.⁷
- Ireland: Prior to Ms. Swift’s three July 2024 Dublin concerts, the Bank of Ireland warned fans that “scammers [...] will be using whatever channels are open to them to try to steal money from desperate Swifties” and that “[c]riminals have been using hacked social media accounts and online ads to try to con people out of hundreds of euro – and possibly even more.” See [Taylor Swift fans warned of ticket scams ahead of Dublin concerts; Bank of Ireland warns fans seeking tickets for Dublin gigs to be alert to criminals’ efforts to con them](#), Irish Times, June 24, 2024.⁸
- United Kingdom: As of April 2024, months before Ms. Swift’s eight London concert dates in June and August, Lloyds Bank was already estimating that thousands of UK fans had lost over £1 million in ticket scams, and that “90% of the reported concert ticket scams started on Facebook.” See April 17, 2024 Lloyds Bank Press Release, [“Avoid a Cruel Summer: Lloyds Bank issues urgent warning over Taylor Swift ticket scams;”](#)⁹ see also [One in four Britons victim of ticket scams for in-demand events, says Nationwide](#), *The Guardian (UK)* (“Building society makes warning to fans desperate not to miss out as resale for Glastonbury festival approaches”).¹⁰
- Australia: Provincial police in early 2024 reported over 250 consumers complained of ticketing scams related to the Eras Tour. See [Victorian fans lose](#)

⁷<https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/apparent-taylor-swift-ticket-scam-targets-hundreds-who-claim-to-be-out-300k/>

⁸<https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/music/2024/06/24/taylor-swift-fans-warned-to-be-aware-of-ticket-scams-ahead-of-dublin-concerts/>

⁹<https://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/assets/pdfs/media/press-releases/2024-press-releases/lloyds-bank/2024.04.17-lloyds-bank-urgent-warning-over-taylor-swift-ticket-scams.pdf>

¹⁰<https://www.theguardian.com/money/2025/apr/07/one-in-four-britons-victim-of-ticket-scams-for-in-demand-events-says-nationwide>



[almost \\$300,000 in scams ahead of Taylor Swift Eras Tour as MCG issues warning for ticketless fans](#), Sky News Australia, February 7, 2024.¹¹

Respectfully, SB 3019 will not lower live event ticket prices or protect Hawaiians, but instead risks driving legitimate resale activity back onto the street corner or the dark corners of the web. Price caps drive legitimate consumer demand and online commerce to places where fraud and the abuse of fans continue to proliferate.

We welcome efforts intended to improve the ticket buying experience for consumers in Hawaii, and in particular are supportive of the requirement to show the total or “all-in” price to consumers when displaying live event tickets for purchase, as called for under pending bill S.B. 3018. We greatly appreciate any consideration you may choose to give this correspondence and welcome any additional questions or inquiries you may have.

Sincerely,

Joe Freeman
Vice President, Government Relations
jfreeman@seatgeek.com

¹¹<https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/crime/victorian-fans-lose-almost-300000-in-scams-ahead-of-taylor-swift-eras-tour-as-mcg-issues-warning-for-ticketless-fans/news-story/455223459481ef816a49f9382281bb81>



March 18, 2026

Testimony of Brian Berry

Executive Director, Ticket Policy Forum

Before the Hawaii State House on Culture and the Arts

Re: S.B. 3019 - Relating to Ticket Resale Price Caps

Position: Opposed

Chair, Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee:

My name is Brian Berry, and I serve as Executive Director of the Ticket Policy Forum (TPF). Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony on S.B. 3019.

The Ticket Policy Forum represents America's leading and most trusted online ticket marketplaces, including StubHub, SeatGeek, Vivid Seats, TickPick, Gametime, and Events Ticket Center. Our member companies serve tens of millions of fans every year by providing secure, guaranteed transactions, fraud prevention, and customer support that protect buyers and sellers.

We appreciate the spirit behind S.B. 3019. Ticket prices for very popular events can be high, and policymakers understandably want to ensure that local fans are treated fairly. Where we respectfully part ways with this bill is not its intent, but its design and likely impact.

As written, S.B. 3019 would create serious compliance problems, would be extremely difficult to enforce in practice, and would produce harmful unintended consequences for Hawaii consumers. In short: demand cannot be legislatively regulated. When government attempts to cap resale prices, buyers and sellers do not stop transacting, they simply move to less safe alternatives where scams and fraud are far more common.

I. WHY PRICE CAPS SOUND SIMPLE BUT FAIL IN PRACTICE

Resale price caps are often proposed as a consumer protection measure. In practice, they function as price controls. Price controls do not eliminate demand for high-demand events. They distort markets, reduce transparency, and push transactions into unregulated channels.

Legitimate marketplaces have spent more than two decades moving ticket resale off street corners and out of risky online forums and into regulated e-commerce platforms with guarantees, identity verification, secure payments, and refund protections. There is simply no reason for Hawaii fans to be pushed back toward cash meetups and shadow markets, yet that is the predictable outcome when safe resale is restricted.



II. COMPLIANCE PROBLEM: MARKETPLACES CANNOT VERIFY “ORIGINAL PURCHASE PRICE”

S.B. 3019’s price cap structure assumes that a resale marketplace can reliably determine the original purchase price of each ticket. Marketplaces often cannot verify the original cost of tickets across systems because Ticketmaster does not provide interoperability that would make this possible for digital tickets, making compliance with S.B. 3019 technically impossible. In many cases, the only way a ticket can be transferred is through proprietary technology systems that do not disclose the original purchase price or the underlying fee structure to third parties.

This creates a major compliance dilemma:

- Resale marketplaces do not have access to the true original ticket price.
- Marketplaces cannot independently verify the original “face value” or original all-in purchase price.
- The marketplace is forced to rely on seller-provided information.
- Without cooperation from the dominant primary ticketing platform, which it has no incentive to provide, compliance becomes guesswork.

When legislation imposes a price cap without requiring primary ticketing interoperability with other sellers and marketplaces, it effectively places secondary marketplaces in an impossible position: comply with a rule that cannot be reliably measured, audited, or enforced.

III. CONSEQUENCE PROBLEM: THE BILL WILL PUSH RESALE INTO LESS SAFE CHANNELS

Because demand cannot be legislatively regulated, the predictable consequence of price caps is displacement. If a fan in Hawaii wants to buy a ticket to a sold-out event and cannot find it on a safe, guaranteed marketplace due to the bill’s restrictions, they will not simply stop trying. They will turn to other channels, including:

- Social media meetups and Facebook groups
- Informal online marketplaces
- Unregulated peer-to-peer transactions
- Cash-based exchanges outside venues
- Encrypted chats and private group message boards

These are precisely the environments where scams, counterfeit tickets, and consumer harm thrive.

In markets that have implemented resale price controls, such as Ireland and certain Australian jurisdictions, research shows reports of ticket-related fraud increased significantly (four times higher), scam-related consumer losses rose sharply, and authorities identified hundreds of fraudulent ticket resale websites. In fact in test purchases responding to ticket offers on social media sites, an [investigative firm](#) found that fans were scammed half of the time. In Ireland, digital bank Revolut, which serves more than 3 million customers, reported a 48% rise in scam-related financial losses and an [80% increase in ticket scam victims](#). In France, a face-value price cap contributed to a surge of Olympics-related scams. A dedicated unit of the National Gendarmerie identified [338 fraudulent ticket websites](#) but was able to shut down only 51.

These outcomes illustrate that when legitimate platforms are restricted, buyers and sellers don't disappear. Instead, fraud rises and consumer protections vanish.

Unlike legitimate marketplaces, these channels typically offer:

- No identity verification
- No secure payment processing
- No fraud detection systems
- No guarantees
- No customer support
- No meaningful recourse for victims

Price caps therefore risk making the resale ecosystem less safe, not more safe.

It is also important to recognize the broader momentum in state policymaking on this issue. While resale price caps have been introduced in recent years, many legislatures walk away from them once they examine the compliance realities and consumer consequences. Massachusetts, for example, recently repealed its resale price cap after concluding it was unworkable. This year, Washington State, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and New Mexico abandoned resale cap proposals after further review. Maryland removed proposed price and fee caps from the legislation it ultimately passed two years ago. These are just several examples.

In recent years, a growing number of states have chosen instead to protect ticket transfer rights and strengthen targeted consumer protections. Today, six states explicitly protect a ticketholder's right to use, transfer, give away, or resell a lawfully purchased ticket, reflecting the widely held consumer view that once a ticket is purchased, it belongs to the buyer. The trend is states moving toward enforceable consumer protection and away from price controls that are difficult to administer and often backfire.



IV. THE BILL CREATES AN UNEVEN AND UNFAIR STANDARD

Some may suggest this legislation will bring down the cost of tickets. It will not. In fact, given that it would regulate only previously purchased tickets, the bill does nothing to prevent ticket prices at the box office or on Ticketmaster from skyrocketing. By neglecting so-called “primary ticket sales” at the box office or through the venue’s contracted ticketing firm, which is most often Ticketmaster, primary ticket prices would still adjust upwards with no restriction regardless of a new law. The recent leak of [internal Ticketmaster communications](#) demonstrates the monopoly’s commitment to arbitrarily raising prices and taking advantage of fans, even going so far as to say they’re “robbing them blind.”

As written, S.B. 3019 means the box office could raise prices in real time through dynamic pricing or other means, but a ticket holder who already purchased a ticket is prohibited from setting a price based on that same demand. For example, regardless of this legislation, one seat might cost \$100 on Ticketmaster and the seat next to it might jump to \$1,000 just a few minutes later.

This approach is inequitable and does not address the root causes of high ticket prices. Maintaining the ability for consumers to comparison shop across multiple ticket sellers where ticketholders set the price that they will accept for their tickets (whether more or less than they originally paid) is important as it provides an important competitive check to box offices.

V. A BETTER PATH FORWARD

TPF supports strong, meaningful protections for fans, including upfront pricing transparency, enforcement against fraud and bots, refund protections, bans on deceptive speculative ticket listings and deceptive websites that pretend to be the venue box office, and improved ticket portability and interoperability. These approaches protect fans without pushing transactions underground and without creating compliance standards that are impossible to meet.

CONCLUSION

We respectfully oppose S.B. 3019.

While we appreciate the intent of the bill, resale price caps are not enforceable in a modern digital ticketing environment where original purchase prices cannot be verified by independent marketplaces. More importantly, the bill will push buyers and sellers into less safe alternatives, increasing fraud and consumer harm.

The Ticket Policy Forum stands ready to work with the Committee and the Legislature on more effective consumer protection solutions that preserve safe, transparent ticket resale and promote real competition in ticketing.



Respectfully submitted,

Brian Berry
Executive Director
Ticket Policy Forum
www.TicketPolicyForum.org



March 17, 2026

The Honorable Jeanne Kapela
Chair
Committee on Culture & Arts
Hawaii House of Representatives
Hawai'i State Capitol, Room 418
415 South Beretania St.
Honolulu, HI 96813

The Honorable Sam Satoru Kong
Vice Chair
Committee on Culture & Arts
Hawaii House of Representatives
Hawai'i State Capitol, Room 425
415 South Beretania St.
Honolulu, HI 96813

RE: SB 3019, S.D. 2, Relating to Consumer Protection

Dear Chair Kapela and Vice Chair Satoru Kong,

On behalf of the National Consumers League (NCL),¹ I am writing regarding Senate Bill 3019, S.D. 2 (SB 3019).² NCL urges the Committee carefully consider the potentially unintended consumer protection implications of the initially proposed resale pricing provisions in the bill.

The debate over ticketing reform is frequently cast as a contest between supposed champions of fans and industry wrongdoers. In reality, there are no white knights in this marketplace. Primary ticket issuers, vertically integrated ticketing platforms, artists, promoters, venues, brokers, and secondary exchanges all operate according to rational economic incentives. Monopoly firms in the primary market like Live Nation-Ticketmaster raise legitimate competition concerns. Secondary marketplaces benefit from scarcity and high-demand pricing. Brokers seek arbitrage opportunities. Venues, artists, and promoters seek to limit transferability not solely to protect fans, but also to preserve revenue streams tied to concessions, merchandise, data collection, or exclusive arrangements. Policy proposals are frequently advanced in ways that advantage one segment of the industry over another.

¹ Founded in 1899, NCL is the nation's oldest consumer advocacy organization. Our non-profit mission is to advocate for consumers and workers in the United States and beyond. For more information, visit www.nclnet.org.

² M Hawaii Senate Bill 3019, SD2, 33rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2026). *Relating to consumer protection*. Retrieved from https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2026/bills/SB3019_SD2_.pdf

SB 3019 proposes to cap the price of tickets resold on secondary markets to three dollars more than the original price as charged by the primary venue ticket provider. The bill also, somewhat inexplicably, eliminates the requirement that ticket brokers refund consumers for all service fees when an event is cancelled. NCL has concerns with both provisions.

Regarding the resale price cap, NCL does not approach this issue ideologically. Our analysis focuses on how specific design choices affect real-world consumer outcomes. Well-intentioned resale caps are often advanced to prevent excessive markups and promote affordability. However, experience and market data suggest that rigid caps can produce unintended consequences if not carefully calibrated and paired with strong enforcement mechanisms.

Demand for high-profile events does not disappear when resale prices are capped. Instead, transactions may migrate away from regulated, buyer-protected platforms and into informal or unregulated channels, including social media platforms, peer-to-peer payment apps, and offshore resale sites. These channels frequently lack meaningful buyer guarantees, identity verification, or refund protections. In those environments, fraud risks rise sharply. Consumers may encounter counterfeit tickets, duplicate barcodes, or sellers who disappear after receiving payment. When that occurs, the loss is not a disputed markup; it is the full purchase price.

A poorly structured resale cap can have the effect of protecting consumers from paying too much while exposing them to losing everything to fraud. That is not a theoretical concern. It is a predictable response to constraining price signals in a high-demand market without simultaneously constraining off-platform transactions.

This does not mean that resale caps are categorically inappropriate. It does mean that lawmakers should carefully consider threshold levels, enforcement capacity, and the interaction between caps and unregulated resale channels. Any resale pricing framework should be evaluated not only on whether it lowers nominal prices in the regulated market, but also on whether it reduces—or inadvertently increases—overall consumer harm. For example, were Hawai'i to adopt the proposed price cap, it is likely that arbitrage revenue currently captured by ticket brokers and regulated resale exchanges would instead go to Ticketmaster via mechanisms such as dynamic pricing, increased volume on its own resale exchange and fees on so-called "fan-to-fan" marketplaces. The goal of this committee should be to protect consumers, not to entrench or advantage a monopolistic business model.

Regarding the elimination of ticket brokers' refund obligations, we see no consumer benefit in this provision. When a consumer is unable to attend a live event due to cancellation of that event, she should be made whole by the entity that sold her that ticket. Such a refund should cover both the purchase price of the ticket and any associated fees charged by the ticket seller, whether the seller was the primary seller or a reseller. We urge you to reinstate this protection.

The live event marketplace is a complex industry where there are no simple solutions to the long-standing frustrations that consumer experience daily: limited ticket availability, high prices, confusing fees, monopolistic behavior, and unethical and illegal reseller practices. A good starting place for this Committee would be to pass S.B. 2031, S.D. 1,³ codifying the federal Junk Fee Rule to ensure that consumers in Hawai'i benefit from "all-in" ticket price transparency.

Thank you for considering the views of the National Consumers League on this important consumer protection bill.

Sincerely,



John D. Breyault
Vice President, Public Policy, Telecommunications, and Fraud
National Consumers League
E-mail: johnb@nclnet.org

³ Hawaii Senate Bill 2031, S.D. 1, 33rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2026). *Relating to consumer protection*. Retrieved from [https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2026/bills/SB2031_SD1 .pdf](https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2026/bills/SB2031_SD1.pdf)



SanHi

GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES

A LIMITED LIABILITY LAW PARTNERSHIP

DATE: March 18, 2026

TO: Representative Jeanne Kapela
Chair, Committee on Culture & Arts

FROM: Tiffany Yajima / Chris Delaunay

RE: **S.B. 3019, SD2, Relating to Consumer Protection**
Hearing Date: Wednesday, March 18, 2026, at 10:30 AM
Conference Room 309

Aloha Chair Kapela, Vice Chair Kong and Members of the Committee:

On behalf of our client StubHub, we write in respectful **opposition** to S.B. 3019, SD2, which would make it unlawful to re-sell a ticket at a price of three dollars or more than the original price charged by the original ticket seller.

StubHub was founded in 2000 to provide a secure, transparent marketplace for ticket resale. Every order on the platform is backed by the FanProtect Guarantee, ensuring that fans either gain entry to the event or receive their money back. StubHub does not set ticket prices. It operates as a marketplace in which sellers determine listing prices and buyers decide what fits their budget.

Resale markets provide flexibility and a form of consumer insurance through refund guarantees. If plans change, travel is disrupted, or family obligations arise, regulated platforms allow consumers to purchase earlier with confidence knowing that they are not locked-in to a sunk cost.

[Resale price caps push transactions into unregulated channels where consumers are more vulnerable to fraud.](#)

Although framed as a consumer protection measure, resale price caps reduce transparency, increase fraud risk, and harm the consumers they aim to protect. When lawful resale on regulated marketplaces is restricted, high-demand transactions do not disappear. Instead, they migrate elsewhere. Fans turn to unverified channels such as social media platforms, private message boards, and offshore websites where there are no guarantees, no customer support, and no recourse if something goes wrong. In these environments, fraud risk increases significantly. For example, during the Taylor Swift Eras Tour in Australia, fans reportedly lost more than \$260,000 to ticket fraud after high-demand sales shifted to unregulated platforms.¹

¹ Sky News, "[Victorian Fans Lose almost \\$300,000 in Scams Ahead of Taylor Swift Eras Tour as MCG Issues Warning for Ticketless Fans](#)," February, 7, 2024.

SB 3019, SD 2, would also be extremely difficult to implement. There is no single, clear “original price” for a ticket. The amount a fan pays often includes a mix of base price, service fees, dynamic pricing, discounts, or bundled packages such as season tickets. As a result, two people sitting next to each other may have paid very different amounts for the same ticket. There is also no reliable way to verify what someone originally paid. That information is not standardized or shared across platforms, and in many cases, it simply isn’t accessible. Without a clear, consistent price to reference, the law would be nearly impossible to apply in practice.

Hawaii would also be an outlier if it adopts a resale price cap. Since 2025, multiple states have considered similar legislation, but none have enacted resale price caps. In fact, states have moved away from these policies. Connecticut and Pennsylvania repealed their caps in 2007, Michigan repealed its cap in 2014 and instead adopted bot-focused protections in 2025, and Massachusetts repealed a nearly century-old cap in 2024. Even recently, Connecticut removed proposed price caps before passing its ticketing legislation.

If the Legislature’s objective is to protect Hawaii consumers from unfair ticket purchasing practices, we suggest that the Committee consider a more targeted approach focused on the use of automated purchasing software (“ticket bots”).

Many states have adopted laws prohibiting the use of automated software to circumvent ticket purchasing limits and security controls implemented by initial ticket sellers. These laws directly address the conduct that allows ticket bots to acquire large quantities of tickets before ordinary consumers have a fair opportunity to purchase them. Targeting the misuse of automated purchasing software protects consumers while preserving legitimate resale marketplaces that provide transparency, consumer protection, and refund guarantees.

For these reasons, we respectfully ask that this measure be deferred.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony.

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/17/2026 1:09:36 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Gregory Dunn	Hawaii Theatre Center	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

The Hawaii Theatre Center is in strong support of this measure. Every week we experience patrons who have been taken advantage of by unscrupulous ticket resellers who have tricked buyers into paying outrageous prices and fees on resold tickets. Often times these resellers mask themselves in websites that appear to be legitimate sites purporting to be the "official seller" of tickets for the Hawaii Theatre. When in reality, the Hawaii Theatre is the only authorized ticket seller for our shows, and for certain shows that the Hawaii Symphony Orchestra holds. This bill will establish a mechanism to support a fair and equitable resale market for legitimate patrons, while disincentivizing bad actors who prey upon our local residents who fall victim to overpriced tickets and scam fees when they want to attend a show at one of our venues.



State Regulation of the Resale Ticket Market: Risks to Competition, Fans, and Antitrust Enforcement

DIANA L. MOSS

PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE

FEBRUARY 2026

State Regulation of the Resale Ticket Market: Risks to Competition, Fans, and Antitrust Enforcement

DIANA L. MOSS

FEBRUARY 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The value of the U.S. live music market is expected to top almost \$20 billion in 2026, with ticket sales accounting for 75% of revenues.¹ Live events, which connect fans with beloved musical artists and sports teams through shared experiences, are some of the most exciting for consumers. Yet the Live Nation-Ticketmaster monopoly continues to generate overwhelmingly negative public opinion in the U.S., as fan frustration with a lack of competition in primary ticketing services, sky-high ticket fees, and a dysfunctional primary ticket continues to mount.²

This should come as no surprise. Live Nation-Ticketmaster controls the entire live events supply chain. Live Nation commands 75% of the markets for concert promotion and exclusive contracts with venues, and Ticketmaster has an 80% share in ticketing.³ Long overdue attention to Live Nation-Ticketmaster's anticompetitive conduct in ticketing is, therefore, a welcome development for millions of fans who have paid a high price for the company's entrenched monopoly power.

This Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) report unpacks the policy tools that are part of federal and state efforts to address competition and consumer protection in ticketing. These developments have the potential to transform the live events ecosystem and will leave an indelible imprint — for better or worse — on consumers, artists, independent venues, and small businesses. For example, the monopolization case filed against Live Nation-Ticketmaster by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and 40 states and the District of Columbia could, if successful, lead to a breakup of the company and spur competition in ticketing. This would increase choice, reduce ticket fees, and pressure companies to improve quality.

Another prong of federal-state activity in ticketing is a crop of proposed consumer protection laws designed to increase transparency in ticket pricing and reduce deceptive practices in the primary and secondary (i.e., “resale”) ticket markets. Yet another development is a handful of proposed state laws that seek to impose economic regulation on the resale market while leaving the monopolized primary ticket market to operate free of external controls. These laws would cap prices and fees for tickets resold in the competitive online marketplaces.⁴

Caps on resale ticket prices and fees go well beyond the conventional boundaries of traditional consumer protection. The resale market balances supply and demand for tickets, compensates for inefficiencies in primary ticketing, and provides the *only* source of competition for millions of music and sports fans.⁵ PPI’s report flags the concern that such regulation will significantly disrupt, and even wipe out, the resale market — defeating the goal of promoting competition and protecting fans.

State regulation of the resale ticket market also risks a policy collision with antitrust enforcement. Antitrust is the most effective tool for fixing the Live Nation-Ticketmaster monopoly that is the source of problems in live event ticketing. PPI’s report unpacks the building blocks for understanding these issues and offers four major takeaways for antitrust enforcers and lawmakers.

- **An antitrust “breakup” of the entrenched Live Nation-Ticketmaster monopoly is essential for restoring competition in the primary ticket market. Any pre-trial settlement would be a failure of enforcement to rid an important market of an entrenched monopoly and to protect competition and consumers.**
- **Policies that maintain a viable and robust resale ticket market are essential for protecting and providing choice for live events fans. With no functional resale market, ticket buyers have no place to go but back to Ticketmaster, where they pay monopoly ticket fees.**
- **Numerous federal and state legislative proposals advance helpful consumer protection provisions for ticketing. These proposals also bootstrap antitrust enforcement by easing ticket supply constraints and promoting comparison shopping in the competitive online resale marketplaces.**
- **State proposals to impose price controls on resale risk hobbling the resale market, creating a patchwork of different state regulations, and interfering with antitrust enforcement. States should model legislation after, or even defer to, federal proposals that avoid price controls and stick expressly to strengthening consumer protection in ticketing.**

I. THE SURGING POPULARITY OF LIVE EVENTS

Live music and sports events are a unique form of entertainment, enjoyed by millions of fans worldwide. The markets that support live events are some of the most important in the modern economy. This is not because they are particularly dynamic or feature transformative technologies. Rather, the markets connect fans with beloved musical artists and sports teams for unique, shared experiences.

By a wide margin, live music concerts are the largest form of entertainment, surpassing live sports and film.⁶ For many top artists, the bulk of their income comes from shows and tours, which support local income and job creation through consumer spending on hospitality, restaurants, shopping, and tourism.⁷ Industry analysis predicts a 7% annual average growth rate for the U.S. live music industry from 2026-2031.⁸ Revenues are projected to increase by about 37% over this period, to about \$27 billion,⁹ driven largely by demand from the millennial and the Gen Z generations.¹⁰

Moreover, ticket prices increased 45% between 2019 and 2024, with a resurgence of demand after live music events resumed after the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.¹¹ Despite growth in the demand for live events, one constant remains. The supply chain continues to be dominated by one firm, Live Nation-Ticketmaster. Live Nation commands 75% of the markets for concert promotion and exclusive contracts with venues, and Ticketmaster has an 80% share in ticketing.¹²

Live Nation-Ticketmaster's entrenched monopoly stands in stark contrast to the growing popularity of live events. Negative public opinion of the company in the U.S. illustrates

this tension.¹³ Moreover, continued outrage over Ticketmaster's monopoly ticket fees and the use of "dynamic pricing" by a dominant firm has further exposed the competition problem in ticketing.

II. THE LIVE NATION-TICKETMASTER MONOPOLY IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH CONTINUED GROWTH IN LIVE EVENTS

A little history is helpful for highlighting how the Live Nation-Ticketmaster monopoly creates a drag on the growth of live events. In 2010, the DOJ gave Live Nation and Ticketmaster an almost "free pass" to merge.¹⁴ The merger created a behemoth with a wingspan covering the entire live events supply chain: artist management, concert promotion, venue management, and primary ticketing.

At the time, Ticketmaster's market share of primary ticketing was 80%, far above what is considered a dominant firm by U.S. antitrust standards.¹⁵ It remains at this level 16 years later, buttressed by Live Nation's high shares in adjacent markets, such as exclusive contracts with venues and concert promotion. This means that Ticketmaster has monopolized primary ticketing in the U.S. for the better part of three decades. Whereas ticket prices are set primarily by the artist, Ticketmaster's market power is most evident in the high fees it charges on tickets, which are typically a percentage of the ticket price.¹⁶ The more tickets Ticketmaster sells, the more monopoly fees it collects.

Had the government decided to block the merger of Live Nation and Ticketmaster under Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 2010, the live events industry might be better able to accommodate growth in demand for live events.¹⁷ Instead, the DOJ resolved concerns over a loss of

competition and harm to consumers with “conduct” remedies. Codified in a 2010 consent decree, these remedies, including non-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions, were designed to prevent the company from exploiting its dominance to stifle competition from smaller ticketing rivals.¹⁸

Needless to say, conduct remedies do nothing to eliminate powerful economic incentives to exercise market power. They also rely on smaller market players to report violations but who are reluctant to do so because they fear retaliation. Indeed, a decade later, a DOJ investigation revealed that Live Nation was violating “the plain language” of the 2010 decree that prohibited the company from conditioning the provision of live concerts on the requirement that an independent venue use Ticketmaster’s services.¹⁹ The DOJ’s evidence showed that Live Nation had, in fact, retaliated against venues that did not comply.

The DOJ’s solution to this problem was not to take stronger enforcement action. Instead, it extended the ineffective remedies in the 2010 decree for another five years.²⁰ The 2020 amended decree staved off a deeper DOJ investigation that would have uncovered the full extent of Live Nation-Ticketmaster’s anticompetitive conduct since the 2010 merger. This in-depth investigation eventually materialized in May of 2024, when the Biden DOJ filed an antitrust case under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.²¹ The case was joined by 40 states and the District of Columbia, one of the largest federal-state antitrust actions in U.S. history.²²

In December 2025, Live Nation-Ticketmaster filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence produced in the case did not

support the government’s claim.²³ If the court agrees, the case can be decided, as a matter of law, without a jury trial that is set to begin in March 2026.²⁴ In parallel with federal-state antitrust enforcement action, there are a number of private antitrust cases alleging that Live Nation-Ticketmaster engaged in anticompetitive conduct that harms consumers. Many of these cases seek damages for monopoly “overcharges.”²⁵

III. LIVE NATION-TICKETMASTER’S CAMPAIGN TO DOMINATE ALL TICKET MARKETS

A. The Chokehold on the Primary Ticket Market

Live Nation-Ticketmaster holds virtually all bargaining leverage vis-à-vis music fans, independent venues, and artists because of its dominant market positions. Even A-List artists like Taylor Swift must deal with Ticketmaster. For example, the Eras Tour was promoted by an affiliate of competitor AEG.²⁶ However, because Live Nation controls most of the venues where Swift appeared, AEG had no choice but to use Ticketmaster, even though it operates AXS, its own ticketing service. Smaller artists have no bargaining leverage. As a result, they face lopsided revenue-sharing agreements with Live Nation and exorbitant fees and commissions that diminish their earnings from ticket and merchandise sales.²⁷

Live Nation-Ticketmaster’s major tool for maintaining its monopoly is the “exclusive contract.”²⁸ These contracts force independent venues to use Ticketmaster’s services. If they decline exclusivity, venues pay a steep price by losing access to Live Nation talent. With high market shares in concert promotion and ticketing, independent venues have virtually no choice but to accept exclusive contracts.

To be sure, Live Nation risks incurring financial losses by cutting off venues if they reject exclusivity. But those losses are more than compensated for by higher revenues from monopoly ticket fees that result from stifling competition in primary ticketing. The magnitude of Live Nation-Ticketmaster's dominance means that even the threat of enforcing its restrictive policies keeps venues "in line."²⁹ By sharing in Live Nation-Ticketmaster's monopoly profits, some independent venues have developed strong incentives to "go along" with policies that maintain its dominance.

Analysis reveals the impact of exclusive agreements on ticket fees. For example, the non-exclusive Los Angeles venue, Crypto.com Arena, was previously home to both the NBA's Lakers, ticketed by Ticketmaster, and the Clippers, ticketed by AXS. A recent survey reveals that in 2023, fees (as a percentage of list ticket price) on tickets for NBA games at Crypto.com Arena are 14 percentage points lower than the national average for NBA ticket fees.³⁰ In contrast, fees on tickets for Wizards games — played at the Capital One Arena, a venue that is exclusive to Ticketmaster — are 26 percentage points higher than the national NBA ticket fee average. This analysis supports the idea that non-exclusive contracting disciplines competition in ticketing, driving down ticket fees.

B. The Relationship Between the Primary and Resale Ticket Markets

The relationship between the primary ticket market, where the Live Nation-Ticketmaster monopoly calls the shots, and the resale market is complex. Resale is a direct outgrowth of the primary market. Namely, for many concert events, tickets in the primary market are deliberately underpriced to attract and build

a fan base for artists.³¹ Underpricing primary tickets increases the probability that an event sells out and also boosts revenue from merchandise and concessions.³²

High demand for underpriced tickets, however, distorts the primary market.³³ For example, it quickly translates to unmet demand when there are supply constraints such as limited venue seating capacity and ticket "holdbacks." Holdbacks involve reserving tickets for the "news media, artist, managers, agents, the record company, the fan club, the promoter, and the tour sponsor," creating artificial scarcity and driving up demand even further.³⁴ Industry sources estimate that holdbacks account for 20% to over 50% of all primary tickets sold for A-list musical artist performances.³⁵ When coupled with underpricing tickets and venue capacity constraints, ticket holdbacks put the excess demand problem on steroids.

With these forces in play, it is no surprise that a robust secondary ticket market operated by exchanges and competitive resale marketplaces has developed in the U.S. Unlike the primary market, ticket prices are determined in the resale market by supply and demand. This provides music fans access to tickets they could not otherwise obtain on the primary market while offering artists the opportunity to put more fans in seats. Because resale ticket prices are more reflective of market conditions, they are also typically more volatile.³⁶

Live events fans have come to rely on resale exchanges and marketplaces that inject efficiency and reduce fraud.³⁷ The secondary market is the only way fans can recoup what they paid for tickets in the primary market due to changed plans, illness, family obligations,

and work schedules. Even Ticketmaster admits to the importance of resale.³⁸ And while ticket buyers may object to higher resale prices for events that are in high demand, they are delighted to pay lower resale prices for events that are in lower demand.

Artists have a difficult relationship with the resale market. Underpricing primary tickets and ticket holdbacks cause significant market dysfunction that the resale ticket market compensates for. While it is not surprising that artists also want to capture resale revenues or “royalties,” it also means they want to collect ticket revenue from sales in the primary market and again when those tickets are resold. Ticketmaster’s use of dynamic pricing that varies in real time with changes in supply and demand responds to this pressure. Dynamic pricing reduces the volume of tickets sold in the secondary market, shifting revenue back to the primary market. This assuages artists’ concern that they are not getting a cut of resale ticket sales, and Ticketmaster generates even more monopoly profits from ticket fees.³⁹ Not surprisingly, however, concert-goers dislike dynamic pricing. Because they tend to buy early due to the fear that a concert will sell out, fans pay dramatically higher primary ticket prices.⁴⁰ Fan backlash during the Bruce Springsteen and Oasis concerts in the U.S. and U.K. illustrates this problem.⁴¹

C. Interference In the Resale Market

To recap, Ticketmaster exercises market power in the primary market by locking independent venues into exclusive contracts to use Ticketmaster for primary ticketing. This has forestalled the emergence of any effective competition in the primary market. This brings us to the resale market and Ticketmaster’s

interference with the transfer of tickets and campaign to denigrate resale. The express purpose of this strategy is to steer fans back to Ticketmaster’s integrated primary-secondary platform, where it can sell more tickets and collect monopoly fees.

Since the time of the merger, Ticketmaster has made steady incursions into resale and amassed market share. For example, with \$4.5 billion in gross transaction value from resale in 2022, more than double what it earned in 2019, Ticketmaster eclipsed many of its rivals with a market share of close to 33%.⁴² Stifling competition in resale is a virtually costless strategy. Ticketmaster gains by steering ticket buyers to its integrated ticketing platform, where it double-dips on fees for tickets that it has already sold on the primary market. Dominating the resale market is, therefore, both easy and lucrative, enough so that Ticketmaster can afford to publicly endorse a 20% price cap on resale tickets.⁴³

The hyper-profitability of hamstringing competition in resale explains Ticketmaster’s strategy to denigrate established, competitive resale marketplaces while touting its own resale business. Live Nation-Ticketmaster has branded exchanges and marketplaces as traditional “scalpers.”⁴⁴ However, proxy data analysis using news coverage hits for the search term “ticket scalping” turns up “Live Nation-Ticketmaster” 75% of the time, followed by Facebook, Craigslist, and eBay.⁴⁵ News coverage on “scalping” does not mention resellers such as StubHub, SeatGeek, and Vivid Seats. Research also shows that consumers are willing to purchase tickets from reliable exchanges and competitive resale marketplaces and are far less likely to purchase tickets from Craigslist or

a street scalper because they are considered higher risk.⁴⁶

State laws governing ticket resale recognize these fundamental differences. For example, about 27% specify that the law only applies to resale within a physical proximity of a venue.⁴⁷ Another 65% of state laws explicitly allow online resale or require the reseller to have a license and provide refunds. The remaining 8% of state laws allow resale with the consent of the venue operator or event organizer. These state carveouts support the legitimacy of resale marketplaces, a reality that Ticketmaster has implicitly accepted by moving rapidly into resale.

For example, in 2008, Ticketmaster acquired Tickets Now, an online ticket resale platform. The acquisition generated Federal Trade Commission (FTC) concern about deceptive sales tactics such as using Ticketmaster's primary ticket platform to steer consumers to its resale platform.⁴⁸ In 2009, Ticketmaster ventured into "paperless" ticketing, which gave the company more control over the transfer of tickets to the resale market.⁴⁹

In 2013, it introduced Ticketmaster Resale, which integrated Ticketmaster's primary and secondary market sales, showing tickets *together* on the same seat map, and increasing the probability that ticket buyers will purchase resale tickets from Ticketmaster.⁵⁰ Integration of Ticketmaster's primary and resale services also provides the opportunity to leverage personal information culled from registration and verification requirements to lock ticket buyers into its system. In 2017, the company announced Verified Fan technology, where ticket buyers register ahead of sale dates to receive

codes allowing them to purchase tickets to tours and shows via preferential placement in a lottery.

In 2018, Ticketmaster introduced the "Fan-to-Fan" ticket resale system, and in 2019, Ticketmaster rolled out its SafeTix app that requires all ticket transfers, from primary to resale, occur on its platform.⁵¹ The app relies on revolving QR codes, known to trigger uncertainty and anxiety for the ticket buyer that a resale ticket won't work at the venue.⁵² The DOJ's amended complaint in its 2024 lawsuit notes "Ticketmaster's rapid increase in secondary market share coincided with its launch of SafeTix technology in or about 2019."⁵³ Collectively, Ticketmaster's acquisitions and strategies in resale have been designed to stifle competition from other resellers, under the guise of protecting ticket buyers from fraud and deception.

IV. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT TARGETS THE SOURCE OF THE COMPETITION PROBLEM IN TICKETING

In 2024, the DOJ filed a major antitrust monopolization case against Live Nation-Ticketmaster. The case alleges that the company uses its monopoly positions in multiple markets to stifle competition in primary ticketing.⁵⁴ The DOJ case gets to the root of dysfunction in ticketing. If the government prevails, it will clear a path for strong antitrust remedies to restore competition and choice in primary ticketing.⁵⁵ This will lower ticket fees to consumers and return more revenue to smaller artists that lack bargaining power.

Potential antitrust remedies include injunctive relief, such as prohibiting Live Nation-Ticketmaster from engaging in exclusive

contracts with venues that help maintain its market power. In *U.S. v. Google*, the court banned exclusive contracts for default placement of Google search on browsers and devices.⁵⁶ A similar prohibition would sever the link between Live Nation's anticompetitive conduct and consumer harm. The government could also ask the court to enjoin further venue acquisitions by Live Nation to reduce its control over the major distribution channel for live events.

While such remedies are possible, they would not fully restore competition in primary ticketing. Shrinking the size and dominance of Live Nation-Ticketmaster with structural remedies, such as asset divestitures, is essential for reducing or eliminating the company's ability or incentive to exercise market power. Two types of divestitures would be necessary. First, a complete divestiture of Ticketmaster would eliminate Live Nation's incentive to throttle independent venues with exclusive contracts. However, transferring ownership of Ticketmaster to another market participant, without reducing its size, will preserve incentives for a *different* owner to limit competition in ticketing.

A second divestiture is necessary to avoid this outcome. This means breaking up the divested Ticketmaster into smaller parts, to be purchased by viable competitors (e.g., AXS, SeatGeek, StubHub, Vivid Seats, and others). This is similar to the breakup of AT&T into several smaller "Baby Bells" in 1984.⁵⁷ Without the shackles of Live Nation-Ticketmaster's exclusive contracts and vertical integration, independent venues could freely choose from competing ticketing platforms.

Giving independent venues a choice would work to spur new entry and more competition

in primary ticketing, lowering ticket fees and improving service quality, ticketing technology, and the protection of user data and privacy. Anything less than a breakup remedy in the DOJ's Live Nation-Ticketmaster case would be yet another failed antitrust enforcement action in ticketing and a disservice to competition and millions of ticket buyers.

V. THE WORST AND THE BEST OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS THAT TARGET TICKETING

A. The Surge in Proposed Ticketing Laws

Federal and state laws governing ticketing generally fall within the ambit of consumer protection that prohibits unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent business or trade practices. These laws can both require and prohibit certain activities in ticketing. For example, event organizers may be required to offer ticket refunds due to event cancellation, or if a ticket fails to grant admission, is not delivered, or is counterfeit. Increasing price transparency so that consumers can see the total cost of a ticket, inclusive of the price and all fees, before they purchase, also protects ticket buyers. Three proposed House and Senate bills crafted around the Transparency In Charges for Key Events Ticketing (TICKET) Act address pricing transparency, resale practices, and refunds.⁵⁸

Federal and state laws may also prohibit the use of automated software (i.e., "bots") that buy up chunks of tickets on the primary market for sale in the secondary market, and "speculative" tickets that are not yet in the possession of a reseller, or listed on multiple websites. The federal BOTS (Better Online Ticket Sales) Act "prohibits individuals from circumventing a ticketer's system to purchase more tickets than permitted by the ticketer."⁵⁹ Two proposed House and Senate bills on the Mitigating Automated

Internet Networks Event Ticketing (MAIN Event) Act also focus on bot prevention.⁶⁰

Consumer protection laws can also promote a well-functioning resale market by prohibiting ticket holdbacks and ensuring transferability so that fans can resell their tickets. These provisions support the functioning of the resale market, competition, and the benefits it delivers to fans and artists. As the DOJ's case moves forward, federal and state lawmakers have proposed a swath of ticketing bills. There are currently over 50 proposed bills in 20 states, most of which ramp up consumer protections for ticketing. However, some state bills go well beyond the conventional boundaries of consumer protection to impose economic regulation on resale through price and fee caps.

Most proposed federal ticketing bills in Congress adhere closely to consumer protection principles while responding to developments in ticketing markets. The volume of state bills has increased markedly over the last few years. For example, the National Conference on State Legislatures' legislation tracker shows an uptick in the number of proposals between 2023 and 2024.⁶¹ Over this two-year period, there is a 21% increase in state ticketing bills passed and/or enacted. However, there is a 38% increase in state bills that failed to pass into law and a 15% decrease in pending bills. The increase in the failure rate and decline in volume of pending bills, relative to the rate of passed bills, likely reflects controversy over the harmful effects of state bills that seek to regulate resale.

B. The Best of State Ticketing Legislation

One of the biggest developments in federal and state legislation is the uptick in up-front, all-in pricing requirements. Without all-in pricing,

the total price, inclusive of all fees and taxes, is shown to the ticket buyer at the end of an often laborious search process. Exhausted from searching, consumers are more likely to simply buy the ticket, even if it is more than they wanted to pay. This so-called "drip pricing" is inefficient and anti-consumer. In contrast, all-in pricing provides the ticket buyer with the total ticket cost at the start, and throughout, the search process. This allows ticket buyers to decide whether to keep searching, or switch to other resale sites, enabling comparison shopping and spurring competition.

Nine states currently have laws that require full disclosure of ticket prices and fees.⁶² Those laws, however, do not specify when in the purchase process this information must be shared with the ticket buyer. The default assumption is that the requirement applies at the end of the process, or point of sale. While this protects consumers from "surprise fees," it does not avoid drip pricing.⁶³ Twenty-four proposed state bills provide for all-in pricing. However, like existing laws, six of those bills do not specify the point in the ticket search process where full disclosure is required, or require it at the point of sale.⁶⁴

Eighteen bills require all-in pricing at the first display of ticket price information, and throughout the search process.⁶⁵ These bills, if passed, will mark a major advance in consumer protection. They recognize the value of price transparency, comparison shopping, and price competition, especially against the backdrop of a monopolized primary ticket market. This legislative consensus ultimately motivated the FTC to pass a rule that requires upfront, all-in pricing for ticket sales.⁶⁶ As noted, however, many of the state proposals on all-in pricing

conflict with the FTC rule, which risks further complicating the ticket-buying process for fans.

There are also a number of state bills containing provisions that improve the functioning of the resale market. One is a prohibition on ticket holdbacks that, as noted earlier, exacerbate dysfunction in the primary market that has negative spillover effects on the resale market. For example, a proposed New York bill restricts the withholding of primary tickets from public sale of more than 10% of seating capacity.⁶⁷

Another provision that supports the functioning of resale is mandating transferability. Six states currently protect consumers' rights to resell their tickets: Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, Utah, and Virginia. Some laws require, for example, that "consumers be offered a freely transferable ticket option (meaning not mobile-only and not locked to one specific ticketing platform or system, such as Ticketmaster or AXS)."⁶⁸ Some state proposals, however, only conditionally prohibit restrictions on the transferability of tickets. These include bills in California, Washington D.C., Wisconsin, and Washington⁶⁹ that protect transferability, subject to certain conditions that are often tied to the definition of a ticket as a "license."⁷⁰

For example, California bill A.B. 1349 defines a "ticket" as a "license that is subject to terms and conditions determined by the rights holder and venue operator."⁷¹ "Tickets as licenses" grant event organizers like Live Nation-Ticketmaster and its owned venues, or the venues its controls under exclusive contracts, significant latitude to prevent ticket buyers from selling their tickets in the resale market. These bills should be viewed with extreme caution.

C. The Worst of State Ticketing Legislation

Some state proposals seek to impose economic regulation on resale by capping resale ticket prices and fees. These bills raise serious concerns. Masquerading as "consumer protection" laws, they contemplate invasive regulation that will hobble the resale market, the only competitive ticket market that often delivers lower prices and fees to consumers.⁷²

For example, a price cap, or ceiling, will drive a "wedge" between demand and supply, creating an artificial shortage. If applied to the resale ticket market, this means that a significant percentage of fans will fail to secure resale tickets. Moreover, caps or prohibitions on ticket fees will also quash incentives for resale marketplaces to remain in the market, or invest in ticketing platform technology.

Rhode Island law currently enforces regulations that cap the prices of resale tickets to a few dollars above face value.⁷³ Proposed state legislation over the last few years, however, reveals a dramatic increase in resale ticket price cap proposals, including, at the time of this writing, 10 bills to cap ticket prices, 11 bills to cap resale ticket fees, and five (of 21 total bills) to cap *both* resale ticket prices and fees. Proposals in New York and Wisconsin that leave decisions on price caps to the artist or event operator effectively cede the decision to Live Nation-Ticketmaster. Since Live Nation-Ticketmaster supports price controls on resale, it is safe to conclude that resale prices will be regulated in these states.⁷⁴

If state bills containing resale price or fee caps pass, the number of states that regulate resale will increase dramatically, with adverse effects

on resale markets, competition, and consumers. First, as fans become frustrated with securing tickets on the resale market, they will lose confidence and eventually stop comparison shopping. This will destabilize the resale market, eliminate the only source of competition in ticketing, and steer fans back to Ticketmaster's integrated ticketing platform. Fans who still want and need to buy on the resale market will be driven back to the fraudulent shadow markets where they were scammed before the advent of online resale marketplaces. Experience with regulation of the resale ticket market in Ireland and Victoria, Australia, shows that it drives fraud and abuse.⁷⁵

Second, state regulation of resale risks a policy collision with antitrust enforcement. For example, government-mandated interference with the resale market will thwart antitrust review and remedies. Investigations into anticompetitive practices and consumer harm involve a detailed analysis of ticket prices. Resale price caps will distort the process of price discovery in the ticketing markets, making it harder for enforcers to determine the extent of monopoly overcharges on Ticketmaster's fees.

Price controls on resale tickets will also create a balkanized, patchwork of state regulation. A significant percentage of music fans travel out of state to see concerts.⁷⁶ The ticket shortages caused by price caps in some states will drive fans to states where prices are not capped. This will leave empty seats in price-capped states and increase ticket price volatility in uncapped states.

Finally, a regulatory regime for resale ticket prices at the state level could create immunity from antitrust law. For example, the "filed rate

doctrine" bars damages awards in private antitrust cases involving claims over rates or prices set by federal and sometimes state agencies. Price caps on resale tickets could well qualify as "filed rates," limiting the role of private enforcement in promoting competition in ticketing markets.⁷⁷

Similarly, price regulation in resale ticketing could immunize federal antitrust enforcement under the "state action doctrine." This is a risk in states with a "clearly articulated" policy to displace competition through price regulation and "active supervision" of that policy.⁷⁸ The loss of antitrust enforcement through either of these immunities will remove a vital tool for protecting competition and consumers.

State lawmakers should be fully cognizant of the significant risks of imposing economic regulation on the resale market. Federal lawmakers have been careful to avoid proposals that regulate resale with price controls. State lawmakers should consider mirroring those proposals, or even deferring to federal law, that sticks expressly to strengthening consumer protection in ticketing.

VI. MAJOR TAKEAWAYS

Antitrust enforcers, lawmakers, and policymakers are at a crossroads in addressing competition and consumer concerns in the live events markets in the U.S. The choice and timing of policy are critical decisions that require careful thought and coordination. One pathway is the restructuring of the ticketing market using antitrust remedies to break Live Nation-Ticketmaster's monopoly hold on the live events supply chain. Another, complementary avenue involves consumer protection initiatives to increase price transparency and prohibit

deceptive practices that thwart consumers' ability to purchase tickets.

Antitrust enforcement and consumer protection legislation should work hand-in-hand to support competition in ticketing. However, price regulation of resale markets will hobble the operation of the only market where there is competition, while simultaneously interfering with antitrust enforcement. Good public policy suggests that state lawmakers should endeavor to keep ticket resale *unregulated* and instead focus on promoting pricing transparency and ticket transferability in resale. This will preserve antitrust's ability to address the source of the competition problem in ticketing, the Live Nation-Ticketmaster monopoly, while ameliorating many of the issues that state regulatory bills seek to fix. PPI's analysis reveals four major recommendations for state lawmakers involving ticketing legislation..

- **The Live Nation-Ticketmaster monopoly is the source of systemic competition and consumer problems in the primary ticket market. Antitrust should be the tip of the spear for correcting this problem. Breaking up the entrenched monopoly is essential for restoring competition. Any pre-trial settlement would be a failure of enforcement to rid an important market of an entrenched monopoly and to protect competition and consumers.**
- **Protecting the viability of the resale ticket market is a policy imperative. The resale market balances supply and demand in ticketing, compensates for many of the distortions in the primary market, and is the only source of competition for ticket buyers. With no functional resale market, ticket buyers have no place to go but back to Ticketmaster, where they pay monopoly ticket fees.**
- **Numerous federal and state legislative proposals advance helpful consumer protection provisions for ticketing. These include enhancing transparency in ticket buying and preventing deceptive practices. This type of consumer protection also works to bootstrap antitrust enforcement by easing ticket supply constraints and promoting comparison shopping in the competitive online resale marketplaces.**
- **State proposals to impose price controls in the resale ticket market go well beyond consumer protection. This invasive regulation of resale risks hobbling the resale market, creating a patchwork of different state regulations, and interfering with antitrust enforcement. States should model legislation after, or even defer to, federal proposals that avoid price controls and stick expressly to strengthening consumer protection in ticketing.**

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- 58 U.S. Congress, Senate, *Transparency In Charges for Key Events Ticketing Act or the TICKET Act*, S 281, 119th Congress, introduced in Senate January 18, 2025, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/281>; U.S. Congress, House, *Transparency In Charges for Key Events Ticketing Act or the TICKET Act*, HR 1401, 119th Congress, introduced in House February 18, 2025, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1402>; and U.S. Congress, Senate, *Transparency In Charges for Key Events Ticketing Act or the TICKET Act*, S 430, 119th Congress, introduced in Senate February 5, 2025, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/430>.
- 59 U.S. Congress, Senate, *Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016 or the BOTS Act of 2016*, S 3183, 114th Congress, Public Law No: 114-274 (December 14 2016), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/3183>.
- 60 U.S. Congress, Senate, *MAIN Event Ticketing Act*, S 196, 119th Congress, amended September 2, 2025, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/196>; U.S. Congress, House, *MAIN Event Ticketing Act*, HR 2713, 119th Congress, introduced in House April 8, 2025, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/2713>.
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- 62 "Ticket Resale Laws by U.S. State."
- 63 "Congressional Requesters: Event Ticket Sales Market Characteristics and Consumer Protection Issues," U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-18-347, (April 2018), at p. 30.
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- 65 See, e.g., Wisconsin S.B. 572, introduced October 2025, <https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2025/related/proposals/sb572>. The three federal ticketing bills (the TICKET Act, the BOSS and SWIFT Act, and the Fans First Act) also contain an all-in pricing provision, although in different ways.
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- 68 "The Issues: How Ticket Owners' Rights & the Resale Market are Being Restricted," Protect Ticket Rights, accessed February 2026, <https://www.protectticketrights.com/the-issues#:~:text=Six%20states%20have%20laws%20that%20require%20consumers,that%20imposes%20more%20fees%20and%20minimum%20pricing>. See also, "Fair Practices for the Ticketing Industry," Coalition for Ticket Fairness, accessed February 2026, <https://www.ctfusa.org/>.
- 69 Washington D.C. Council Bill DC26-0224: Restricting Egregious Scalping Against Live Entertainment (RESALE) Amendment Act of 2025, <https://legiscan.com/DC/drafts/B26-0224/2025>; State of Wisconsin A.B.569: Relating to: requirements for the sale and resale of entertainment event tickets and providing a penalty. (FE), <https://fastdemocracy.com/bill-search/wi/2025-2026/bills/WIB00015225/>; and State of Washington H.B. 1613: Concerning Ticket Sales, <https://legiscan.com/WA/bill/HB1613/2025>.
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- 72 "Ticket Resale Saves California Live Event Fans Nearly \$68 Million," Protect Ticket Rights, May 22, 2024, <https://www.protectticketrights.com/files/california-ticket-resale-savings-2021--20242011241113.pdf>. See also, John Breyault, Brian Hess, and Gary Adler, "The Taylor Swift Meltdown was About Greed, not Bots," *DC Journal*, January 2023, <https://dcjournal.com/dear-congress-the-taylor-swift-meltdown-was-about-greed-not-bots/>.
- 73 RI Gen L § 5-22-26 (2024).
- 74 Cooke, "Live Nation Boss."
- 75 "Ticket Fraud: Its Impact and the Cost of Market Regulation," Bradshaw Advisory, March 16, 2025, <https://bradshawadvisory.com/insights/ticket-fraud-its-impact-and-the-cost-of-market-regulationnbsp>.
- 76 "Concert Tourism in 2026: Turning Your Venue into a Destination for Traveling Fans," Ticket Fairy, updated January 2026, <https://www.ticketfairy.com/blog/concert-tourism-in-2026-turning-your-venue-into-a-destination-for-traveling-fans>.

77 See, e.g., *Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.*, 260 U.S. 156 (1922).

78 See, e.g., *Parker v. Brown*, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

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SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/13/2026 12:10:42 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
lynne matusow	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

I am in full support of this bill. As a concert goer and theatre aficionado, I do not appreciate getting ripped off at the box office.

Please move this bill forward.

Lynne Matusow

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 7:04:30 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Cynthia J Hart	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

I support this bill. Too many times I have gone to buy concert tickets only to find them 3-5 times the actual price of the ticket at the original price. Very frustrating and disappointing.

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 7:13:40 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Nancy Choe	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

I support SB3019 because resale markups are making live events less accessible to Hawaii families.

not realistic.

This bill would help keep live entertainment within reach for the people who live here.

Please support SB3019.

Mahalo for your time and service.

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 8:16:21 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Michelle Bonk	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Please pass this bill as a common sense consumer protection measure.

Local fans and families should be able to access tickets at their original market price. They should not be beat out by outside speculators buying large quantities of tickets only to sell them at a much higher price.

Thank you for your work.

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 8:34:55 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Andrea Kahana	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Support

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 8:45:55 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Anita Bascar	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Support

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 9:16:55 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Jana Newell	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Support sb3019. Fair ticket prices for local residents .

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 9:17:54 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Blaine Fergerstrom	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

Please support SB3019 as a common-sense consumer protection measure for Hawai'i.

Many residents try to purchase tickets at the original price and cannot, only to see those same tickets reappear online at higher prices soon after.

SB3019 would protect Hawai'i consumers by preventing resale above the original price paid.

I respectfully urge you to pass SB3019.

Mahalo for the opportunity to submit testimony.

Blaine Fergerstrom

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 9:24:26 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Rona Uyehara	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

I support SB3019 because Hawai'i residents deserve a fair opportunity to purchase tickets at the original price when they go on sale.

Too often, tickets are gone immediately and then show up on resale websites at much higher prices.

I respectfully ask you to support SB3019.

Mahalo for your consideration.

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 9:52:45 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Nancy Depicolzuane	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

I'm in support of SB3019.

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 10:22:54 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Carolyn Caylor	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

I support SB3019

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 11:36:45 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Ashley Miller	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

Please support SB3019 as a common-sense consumer protection measure for Hawai'i.

Many residents try to purchase tickets at the original price and cannot, only to see those same tickets reappear online at higher prices soon after.

SB3019 would protect Hawai'i consumers by preventing resale above the original price paid.

I respectfully urge you to pass SB3019.

Mahalo for the opportunity to submit testimony.

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

I support SB3019 because resale markups are making live events less accessible to Hawai'i families.

When tickets are quickly purchased and relisted online for higher prices, local residents lose the opportunity to buy at the original price. For many of us, paying significantly more is not realistic.

This bill would help keep live entertainment within reach for the people who live here.

Please support SB3019.

Mahalo for your time and service.

Gerald Yamada

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 12:13:41 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
WENDY Mie YAMADA	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

We strongly support this Bill as we were scammed by a third party website in 2024.

This website has since been shut down as they tried to present themselves as tickemaster.

It took us many months to dispute the \$9,000 charge for 4 tickets that this resaler did not even purchase (see attached to american express for details)

Since i am not sure that the file was attached..i've embedded it into here

May 1, 2024

American Express

Dispute D -060195466

To whom it may concern:

I received the merchant response . (cannot read most of the fine print and confirmed via telephone call with American express that they cannot read it either).

However,

1. Not disputing the fact that I purchased 4 tickets for Carrie Underwood concert on ticketsforsale.com
2. Not disputing the fact that payment went through paypal and American express.
3. What I am disputing is that I was told that this was a speculative tickets reseller and that tickets were ALL SALES FINAL
4. There was no CLEAR display of sales terms and conditions . In fact

Pages 4-15 or merchant response is NOT what I saw on the website that I purchased from.

1. There was no CLEAR indication that tickets would not be available till 1 day prior to the show. I would NOT have agreed to this as we do not live near to the venue.

It was AFTER the purchase that I was sent an email that said tickets will be available 7/17/24.
(see attached email)

1. I did call them upon receipt of the email to inquire about cancelling and was then told ALL SALES are final. Which I was NOT told prior to purchase.

Also, the promoter said this is clearly SPECULATIVE listing

speculative listing is when unofficial sellers list tickets for sale even though they do not actually have those tickets. They are betting (or speculating) that they will be able to get tickets and then resell them to fans. People claiming to sell these tickets are committing fraud and this practice is illegal in many states.

1. AMEX has clear documentation from the PROMOTER and OWNER RICK BARTALINI saying they had no legal claim to these tickets . And attempting to sell something they do not own at 300 percent more than value is unfair and unethical.

1. If they do legally own and have the tickets, please have them provide it NOW

We can't and don't want to wait till July 17 to FIND OUT IF we get tickets after we are out almost \$9,000

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 1:01:03 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Louann Suppa	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

SUPPORT

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 2:18:29 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Hailey Bowen	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

I support SB3019 because Hawai'i residents deserve a fair opportunity to purchase tickets at the original price when they go on sale.

Too often, tickets are gone immediately and then show up on resale websites at much higher prices. For many local families, that means paying more or missing out entirely.

Resale should not be permitted above the original price paid.

I respectfully ask you to support SB3019 and protect Hawai'i residents.

Mahalo for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Hailey B.

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 3:04:16 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Jennifer Kanai-Laciste	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

SUPPORT

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 3:13:52 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Dyrell Asuncion-Acosta	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair, Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

I am writing in support of SB3019 because Hawai'i residents deserve a fair opportunity to purchase tickets at their original price when they first go on sale.

Too often, tickets sell out almost immediately and then reappear on resale websites at much higher prices. For many local families, this means either paying far more than they can afford or missing out altogether.

Ticket resale should not be allowed above the original price paid. Consumers should be protected from unfair markups that make live events less accessible to the people of Hawai'i.

I respectfully ask you to support SB3019 and help protect Hawai'i residents from excessive ticket resale prices.

Mahalo for your consideration.

Sincerely,
Dyrell Asuncion - Acosta

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/14/2026 10:36:31 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Christel Thompson	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

I support SB3019 because resale markups are making live events less accessible to Hawai'i families.

When tickets are quickly purchased and relisted online for higher prices, local residents lose the opportunity to buy at the original price. For many of us, paying significantly more is not realistic.

This bill would help keep live entertainment within reach for the people who live here.

Please support SB3019.

Mahalo for your time and service.

Christel Thompson

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/15/2026 7:31:36 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Konrad Ikei	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

I support SB3019 because Hawai'i residents deserve a fair opportunity to purchase tickets at the original price when they go on sale.

Too often, tickets are gone immediately and then show up on resale websites at much higher prices. For many local families, that means paying more or missing out entirely.

Resale should not be permitted above the original price paid.

I respectfully ask you to support SB3019 and protect Hawai'i residents.

Mahalo for your consideration.

Sincerely,
Konrad Ikei

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/15/2026 7:42:48 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
A. Mark Leung	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Support

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/15/2026 12:56:01 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Mark Phillipson	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Dear Chair, Vice-Chair, and Committee Members,

I strongly support SB 3019. Right now it's legal for these large ticket companies to swoop in to get the best seats only to resale them, often making 100s of percent on their investment. Easy peasy. No wonder they are fighting to keep a law from this predatory practice in place.

And if the attorney in consumer affairs is against because of enforcement issues, have a suggestion....use AI. That not an excuse not to have the law.

Please keep this bill moving along for your constituents and not for these ticket companies.

Mahalo,

Mark Phillipson

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/15/2026 2:15:33 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Pam Davis	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

I support SB3019 because resale markups are making live events less accessible to Hawai'i families.

When tickets are quickly purchased and relisted online for higher prices, local residents lose the opportunity to buy at the original price. For many of us, paying significantly more is not realistic.

This bill would help keep live entertainment within reach for the people who live here.

Please support SB3019.

Mahalo for your time and service.

Sincerely,

Pam Davis

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/15/2026 4:26:25 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Teresa Gonzalez	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

I support SB3019 because Hawai'i residents deserve a fair opportunity to purchase tickets at the original price when they go on sale. Too often, tickets are gone immediately and then show up on resale websites at much higher prices. For many local families, that means paying more or missing out entirely. Resale should not be permitted above the original price paid. I respectfully ask you to support SB3019 and protect Hawai'i residents. Thank you in advance.

Teresa Gonzalez

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/15/2026 5:48:39 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Alayna Call	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

I respectfully support SB3019.

When tickets are quickly bought and then resold online for higher prices, it becomes harder for Hawai'i residents to buy tickets at the original price.

SB3019 would protect consumers by limiting resale prices so that local fans are not priced out.

Please vote in favor of SB3019.

Mahalo

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/16/2026 1:12:12 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Kalani Anderson	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

I support SB3019 because Hawai'i residents deserve a fair opportunity to purchase tickets at the original price when they go on sale.

Too often, tickets are gone immediately and then show up on resale websites at much higher prices. For many local families, that means paying more or missing out entirely.

Resale should not be permitted above the original price paid.

I respectfully ask you to support SB3019 and protect Hawai'i residents.

Mahalo for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Kalani Anderson

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/16/2026 7:37:27 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Malia Eversole	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

I fully support this bill to provide Hawaii residents with lower & fairer event ticket prices.

Del Green
60 N. Beretania Street, #3806
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817

March 16, 2026

To: House Committee on Culture & Arts

RE: Strong Support for SB3019 – Relating to Consumer Protection
(Prohibiting the Sale of Event Tickets Above the Original Price in
Hawaii'i)

Dear Chair and Members of the Committee,

Aloha! My name is Del Green, and I am an avid concertgoer and Hawai'i resident. I am writing in strong support of SB3019, which would prohibit the resale of event tickets above their original purchase price, including through primary sellers like Ticketmaster and secondary marketplaces such as StubHub, SeatGeek, and Vivid Seats.

Live music and entertainment are more than just leisure activities — they are vital cultural experiences that bring our communities together. In Hawai'i, where we are geographically isolated and already face higher costs for travel and entertainment, ticket scalping creates an additional and unfair financial barrier for residents who simply want to enjoy live performances.

As a frequent attendee of concerts and live events in Hawai'i, I have repeatedly experienced the frustration of seeing tickets sell out within minutes, only to reappear almost immediately on resale platforms at two, three, or even five times the original face value. This practice does not benefit artists, venues, or fans. Instead, it rewards speculative resellers who exploit demand and use automated tools to purchase large quantities of tickets before genuine fans have a fair opportunity.

For local families, students, and working residents, these inflated resale prices often make attendance impossible. The result is that many seats go to those who can afford excessive markups rather than to the fans who support artists year-round. In a state already facing a high cost of living, allowing unlimited resale markups exacerbates inequity and undermines access to cultural events.

This legislation would not eliminate legitimate ticket transfers. It would simply ensure that resales occur at or below the original purchase price, preventing price gouging while still allowing flexibility for individuals who can no longer attend an event. Such a policy promotes fairness, transparency, and consumer protection.

Other essential goods and services are subject to price gouging protections during times of high demand. Live event tickets — especially in a geographically isolated market like Hawai'i — deserve similar safeguards to protect consumers from exploitative practices.

House Committee on Culture & Arts
March 16, 2026
Page 2

I respectfully urge you to support this bill and stand with Hawai'i residents who believe that live music and entertainment should be accessible, not treated as a speculative commodity.

Mahalo for your time and consideration.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Del Green

Del Green

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/16/2026 12:00:06 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Atsushi Jim Terakubo	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

Please support SB3019 as a common-sense consumer protection measure for Hawai‘i.

Many residents try to purchase tickets at the original price and cannot, only to see those same tickets reappear online at higher prices soon after.

SB3019 would protect Hawai‘i consumers by preventing resale above the original price paid.

I respectfully urge you to pass SB3019.

Mahalo for the opportunity to submit testimony.

Aloha Chair and Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

I support SB3019.

It's a start in the right direction for fair ticket prices. It is time to take back the arts from the unscrupulous practices of secondary marketeers buying up tickets to popular shows and reselling them at highly inflated prices. These companies have contributed nothing to the creative process and are often at odds with the artists and promoters who have carefully set ticket prices for the benefit of their fans while making sure those prices cover the costs of production and their rightful earnings.

It's important to stop secondary marketeers from buying , hoarding and increasing the cost on a significant amount of inventory that should be available to the general public at face value. These secondary sites are manufactured to look so similar to the original facility/sale website that people can be tricked into thinking they are buying from the legitimate source.

I support SB3019 as a way to protect Hawaii's residents and families so they are not priced out of enjoying the arts. I hope that other states and governments will support actions like this.

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/16/2026 10:33:39 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Jacqueline J Conant	Individual	Support	In Person

Comments:

Aloha Chair, Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee,

My name is **Jackie Conant**, a resident of Hawai‘i, and I respectfully offer my strong support for SB3019.

I support SB3019 because Hawai‘i residents deserve a fair and equitable opportunity to purchase tickets at their original price when they are first released.

Too often, tickets sell out within minutes and reappear on resale platforms at significantly inflated prices. For many local families, this creates an unfair barrier—forcing them to either pay far more than intended or miss out entirely on events that should be accessible to our community.

This issue is especially impactful in Hawai‘i. Our residents already face one of the highest costs of living in the nation, where everyday expenses—from housing to food to transportation—are significantly higher than on the continent. In addition, we are geographically isolated. Attending events often requires substantial travel, whether inter-island or to the continental United States or abroad, adding airfare, lodging, and other costs on top of ticket prices.

When tickets are resold at inflated rates, it disproportionately affects Hawai‘i residents who are already paying a premium simply to participate in experiences that others may access more easily. Allowing excessive resale pricing further compounds the financial burden of living in an island state, oceans away from most major venues and events.

Resale should not be permitted above the original price paid. Establishing this protection helps ensure fairness, accessibility, and equity for our local community.

I respectfully ask you to support SB3019 and help protect Hawai‘i residents from price gouging practices that place events out of reach.

Mahalo for your consideration.

Sincerely,
Jackie Conant
Honolulu, Hawai‘i

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/17/2026 12:33:21 AM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Dave Erwin	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Please support this bill in order to keep ticket prices fair. The costs of entertainment in the islands are already steep, and the last thing we need is a middle man to make it worse! Thanks you

SB-3019-SD-2

Submitted on: 3/17/2026 5:14:21 PM

Testimony for CAA on 3/18/2026 10:30:00 AM

Submitted By	Organization	Testifier Position	Testify
Trini Amador	Individual	Support	Written Testimony Only

Comments:

Vote to not allow scalping please! Scalping prices out local fans and rewards middlemen over the community. This bill protects fair access and keeps Hawaii's live events for Hawaii.

I live on the mainland and Hawaii entertainment is expensive because of the distance acts have to travel. Keep prices low for all. Thanks