S.R. NO. 66

MAR 0 6 2020

SENATE RESOLUTION

REQUESTING THE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU TO CONDUCT A STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ENACTING STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE INSURERS IN HAWAII TO RESTRAIN OR BALANCE THE MONOPSONISTIC MARKET POWER OF HEALTHCARE INSURERS OVER INDEPENDENT PHYSICIANS.

1 WHEREAS, the health care system in Hawaii is in crisis
2 because there is a severe shortage of physicians in the State;
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5 WHEREAS, the gap between supply and demand for doctors in 6 Hawaii has grown by sixty-five percent since 2010, according to 7 the recent Physician Workforce Assessment Study conducted in 8 2020 by the Area Health Education Center of Hawaii at the 9 University of Hawaii; and

11 WHEREAS, the biannual Physician Workforce Assessment Study 12 also reported an estimated shortage of eight hundred twenty 13 physicians with the neighbor islands being hardest hit; and

WHEREAS, there is a physician shortfall of sixteen percent on Oahu, compared with a forty-four percent shortfall for Hawaii island, thirty-six percent for Maui County, and thirty-two percent for Kauai; and

WHEREAS, the physician shortage is due to the State's
increasing inability to recruit and retain physicians, and poses
a serious problem for Hawaii residents because it prevents
timely and appropriate access to life-saving healthcare; and

WHEREAS, a primary barrier to recruiting and retaining physicians is the fact that physician compensation in Hawaii is relatively low and not competitive nationally, as evidenced by Hawaii's inability to attract qualified out-of-state physicians or to retain graduates from the John A. Burns School of Medicine in Honolulu; and

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WHEREAS, a major factor in the relatively low compensation 1 2 for Hawaii's physicians is the State's highly concentrated 3 health insurance market; and 4 5 WHEREAS, an examination of the Hawaii insurance market by 6 the American Medical Association (AMA) entitled "Competition in 7 Health Insurance: A Comprehensive Study of U.S. Markets" (2019), reveals a highly concentrated total insurance market, 8 with a single insurer controlling sixty-seven percent of the 9 total market, and its second largest insurer controlling twenty-10 one percent; and 11 12 13 WHEREAS, the AMA ranked Hawaii to be the third least competitive health insurance market in the nation, behind only 14 Alabama and Louisiana; and 15 16 17 WHEREAS, highly concentrated health insurance markets are 18 said to cause disparate, imbalanced, and monopsonistic market 19 power between insurers and the independent physicians providing health care services; and 20 21 WHEREAS, in addition to market concentration, the 22 23 relatively weak bargaining power of physicians compared to health insurers is also a result of federal antitrust law, which 24 generally bars physicians from collectively negotiating their 25 26 contracts with insurers, and contributes to the monopsonistic market favoring insurers; and 27 28 29 WHEREAS, independent physicians contend that such monopsony power enables health plans to approach contract negotiations 30 with a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude that puts physicians in 31 the untenable position of accepting inappropriate and "adhesive" 32 33 contract terms; and 34 WHEREAS, in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the 35 United States Supreme Court created an exemption to federal 36 antitrust laws referred to as the "State Action Doctrine" or the 37 38 "Parker Immunity Doctrine", and authorized state actions that 39 could foreseeably cause anti-competitive effects when taken pursuant to a clearly expressed and legislatively adopted state 40 policy; and 41 42



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WHEREAS, in 2009, the Alaska Legislature found that 1 permitting physicians to engage in collective negotiation of 2 contracts with health benefit plans to be appropriate and 3 4 necessary to benefit competition in the health care market, and adopted a statute consistent with the Parker Immunity Doctrine 5 to authorize collective negotiations between competing 6 7 physicians and health benefit plans; and 8 9 WHEREAS, it is appropriate and necessary for the State of 10 Hawaii to consider authorizing physicians to collectively negotiate their contracts with health benefit plans to address 11 the physician shortage crisis in Hawaii; now, therefore, 12 13 14 BE IT RESOLVED by the Senate of the Thirtieth Legislature 15 of the State of Hawaii, Regular Session of 2020, that the Legislative Reference Bureau is requested to conduct a study of 16 the Alaska Legislation, the Parker Immunity Doctrine and its 17 18 current legal status, the extent of any statutory or policy 19 implementation by other states, and the feasibility of enacting a statutory authority compliant with the Parker Immunity 20 Doctrine to allow collective negotiation between physicians and 21 health care insurers in Hawaii; and 22 23 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Legislative Reference 24 Bureau is requested to submit a report of its findings and 25 conclusions, including any recommended legislation, to the 26 Legislature no later than twenty days prior to the convening of 27 the Regular Session of 2021; and 28 29 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that certified copies of this 30 31 Resolution be transmitted to the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Director of the 32 Legislative Reference Bureau. 33 34 35 36 OFFERED BY:



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