THE SENATE THIRTIETH LEGISLATURE, 2020 STATE OF HAWAII

S.C.R. NO. 102

MAR 0 6 2020

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

REQUESTING THE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU TO CONDUCT A STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ENACTING STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE INSURERS IN HAWAII TO RESTRAIN OR BALANCE THE MONOPSONISTIC MARKET POWER OF HEALTHCARE INSURERS OVER INDEPENDENT PHYSICIANS.

WHEREAS, the health care system in Hawaii is in crisis
because there is a severe shortage of physicians in the State;
and
4

5 WHEREAS, the gap between supply and demand for doctors in 6 Hawaii has grown by sixty-five percent since 2010, according to 7 the recent Physician Workforce Assessment Study conducted in 8 2020 by the Area Health Education Center of Hawaii at the 9 University of Hawaii; and

WHEREAS, the biannual Physician Workforce Assessment Study also reported an estimated shortage of eight hundred twenty physicians with the neighbor islands being hardest hit; and 14

WHEREAS, there is a physician shortfall of sixteen percent on Oahu, compared with a forty-four percent shortfall for Hawaii island, thirty-six percent for Maui County, and thirty-two percent for Kauai; and

WHEREAS, the physician shortage is due to the State's increasing inability to recruit and retain physicians, and poses a serious problem for Hawaii residents because it prevents timely and appropriate access to life-saving healthcare; and

25 WHEREAS, a primary barrier to recruiting and retaining 26 physicians is the fact that physician compensation in Hawaii is 27 relatively low and not competitive nationally, as evidenced by 28 Hawaii's inability to attract qualified out-of-state physicians



10

19

S.C.R. NO. 102

or to retain graduates from the John A. Burns School of Medicine 1 2 in Honolulu; and 3 4 WHEREAS, a major factor in the relatively low compensation 5 for Hawaii's physicians is the State's highly concentrated health insurance market; and 6 7 8 WHEREAS, an examination of the Hawaii insurance market by 9 the American Medical Association (AMA) entitled "Competition in Health Insurance: A Comprehensive Study of U.S. Markets" 10 (2019), reveals a highly concentrated total insurance market, 11 with a single insurer controlling sixty-seven percent of the 12 13 total market, and its second largest insurer controlling twenty-14 one percent; and 15 16 WHEREAS, the AMA ranked Hawaii to be the third least 17 competitive health insurance market in the nation, behind only 18 Alabama and Louisiana; and 19 20 WHEREAS, highly concentrated health insurance markets are 21 said to cause disparate, imbalanced, and monopsonistic market power between insurers and the independent physicians providing 22 23 health care services; and 24 25 WHEREAS, in addition to market concentration, the relatively weak bargaining power of physicians compared to 26 health insurers is also a result of federal antitrust law, which 27 28 generally bars physicians from collectively negotiating their contracts with insurers, and contributes to the monopsonistic 29 30 market favoring insurers; and 31 32 WHEREAS, independent physicians contend that such monopsony 33 power enables health plans to approach contract negotiations 34 with a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude that puts physicians in 35 the untenable position of accepting inappropriate and "adhesive" 36 contract terms; and 37 WHEREAS, in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the 38 United States Supreme Court created an exemption to federal 39 40 antitrust laws referred to as the "State Action Doctrine" or the 41 "Parker Immunity Doctrine", and authorized state actions that could foreseeably cause anti-competitive effects when taken 42



S.C.R. NO. 102

pursuant to a clearly expressed and legislatively adopted state 1 policy; and 2 3 4 WHEREAS, in 2009, the Alaska Legislature found that 5 permitting physicians to engage in collective negotiation of 6 contracts with health benefit plans to be appropriate and 7 necessary to benefit competition in the health care market, and adopted a statute consistent with the Parker Immunity Doctrine 8 9 to authorize collective negotiations between competing 10 physicians and health benefit plans; and 11 12 WHEREAS, it is appropriate and necessary for the State of 13 Hawaii to consider authorizing physicians to collectively negotiate their contracts with health benefit plans to address 14 15 the physician shortage crisis in Hawaii; now, therefore, 16 17 BE IT RESOLVED by the Senate of the Thirtieth Legislature 18 of the State of Hawaii, Regular Session of 2020, the House of 19 Representatives concurring, that the Legislative Reference Bureau is requested to conduct a study of the Alaska 20 21 Legislation, the Parker Immunity Doctrine and its current legal status, the extent of any statutory or policy implementation by 22 23 other states, and the feasibility of enacting a statutory 24 authority compliant with the Parker Immunity Doctrine to allow 25 collective negotiation between physicians and health care 26 insurers in Hawaii: and 27 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Legislative Reference 28 29 Bureau is requested to submit a report of its findings and 30 conclusions, including any recommended legislation, to the 31 Legislature no later than twenty days prior to the convening of 32 the Regular Session of 2021; and 33

34 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that certified copies of this 35 Concurrent Resolution be transmitted to the President of the 36 Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Director of 37 the Legislative Reference Bureau.

OFFERED BY:



38 39 40