§134-7 Ownership, possession, or control prohibited, when; penalty. (a) No person who is a fugitive from justice or prohibited from possessing a firearm or ammunition under title 18 United States Code section 922 or any other provision of federal law shall own, possess, or control any firearm or ammunition.

(b) No person who is being prosecuted for one or more charges for a felony, a crime of violence, a criminal offense relating to firearms, or an illegal sale or distribution of any drug in a court in this State or elsewhere, or who has been convicted in this State or elsewhere of having committed a felony, a crime of violence, a criminal offense relating to firearms, or an illegal sale or distribution of any drug shall own, possess, or control any firearm or ammunition.

(1) Is or has been under treatment or counseling for addiction to, abuse of, or dependence upon any dangerous, harmful, or detrimental drug, intoxicating compound as defined in section 712-1240, or intoxicating liquor;

(2) Has been acquitted of a crime on the grounds of mental disease, disorder, or defect pursuant to section 704-411 or any similar provision under federal law, or the law of another state, a United States territory, or the District of Columbia;

(3) Is or has been diagnosed with or treated for a medical, behavioral, psychological, emotional, or mental condition or disorder that causes or is likely to cause impairment in judgment, perception, or impulse control to an extent that presents an unreasonable risk to public health, safety, or welfare if the person were in possession or control of a firearm; or

(4) Has been adjudged to:

(A) Meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization under section 334-60.2; or

(B) Be an "incapacitated person", as defined in section 560:5-102,

unless the person establishes, with appropriate medical documentation, that the person is no longer adversely affected by the criteria or statuses identified in this subsection.

(d) No person who is less than twenty-five years old and has been adjudicated by the family court to have committed a felony, a crime of violence, a criminal offense relating to firearms, or an illegal sale or distribution of any drug shall own, possess, or control any firearm or ammunition.

(e) No minor shall own, possess, or control any firearm or ammunition if the minor:

(1) Is or has been under treatment for addiction to any dangerous, harmful, or detrimental drug, intoxicating compound as defined in section 712-1240, or intoxicating liquor;

(2) Is a fugitive from justice; or

(3) Has been determined not to have been responsible for a criminal act or has been committed to any institution on account of a mental disease, disorder, or defect,

unless the minor establishes, with appropriate medical documentation, that the minor is no longer adversely affected by the addiction, mental disease, disorder, or defect.

For the purposes of enforcing this section, and notwithstanding section 571-84 or any other law to the contrary, any agency within the State shall make its records relating to family court adjudications available to law enforcement officials.

(f) No person who has been restrained pursuant to an order of any court, including a gun violence protective order issued pursuant to part IV, from contacting, threatening, or physically abusing any person, shall possess, control, or transfer ownership of any firearm or ammunition, so long as the protective order, restraining order, or any extension is in effect. The protective order or restraining order shall specifically include a statement that possession, control, or transfer of ownership of a firearm or ammunition by the person named in the order is prohibited. The person shall relinquish possession and control of any firearm and ammunition owned by that person to the police department of the appropriate county for safekeeping for the duration of the order or extension thereof. At the time of service of a protective order or restraining order involving firearms and ammunition issued by any court, a police officer may take custody of any and all firearms and ammunition in plain sight, those discovered pursuant to a consensual search, and those firearms surrendered by the person restrained. If the person restrained is the registered owner of a firearm and knows the location of the firearm, but refuses to surrender the firearm or disclose the location of the firearm, the person restrained shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. In any case, when a police officer is unable to locate the firearms and ammunition either registered under this chapter or known to the person granted protection by the court, the police officer shall apply to the court for a search warrant pursuant to chapter 803 for the limited purpose of seizing the firearm and ammunition.

(g) Any person disqualified from ownership, possession, control, or the right to transfer ownership of firearms and ammunition under this section shall surrender or dispose of all firearms and ammunition in compliance with section 134-7.3.

(h) Any person who otherwise would be prohibited under subsection (b) from owning, possessing, or controlling a firearm and ammunition solely as a result of a conviction for a crime that is not a felony, and who is not prohibited from owning, possessing, or controlling a firearm or ammunition for any reason under any other provision of this chapter or under title 18 United States Code section 922 or another provision of federal law, shall not be prohibited under this section from owning, possessing, or controlling a firearm and ammunition if twenty years have elapsed from the date of the conviction.

(i) Any person violating subsection (a) or (b) shall be guilty of a class C felony; provided that any felon violating subsection (b) shall be guilty of a class B felony. Any person violating subsection (c), (d), (e), (f), or (g) shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. [L 1988, c 275, pt of §2; am L 1990, c 191, §1; am L 1993, c 215, §1; am L 1994, c 204, §§6, 7; am L 1995, c 189, §§2, 26; am L 1998, c 133, §5; am L 1999, c 297, §1; am L 2000, c 127, §2; am L 2004, c 4, §1; am L 2006, c 27, §2; am L 2019, c 150, §3; am L 2023, c 52, §6]

Law Journals and Reviews

Empowering Battered Women: Changes in Domestic Violence Laws in Hawai`i. 17 UH L. Rev. 575 (1995).

Case Notes

Summary judgment granted to defendants where plaintiff's 1997 harassment conviction constituted a conviction for a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" and, as a matter of statutory construction, the unavailability of a procedure for either expungement, set-aside, pardon, or civil rights restoration did not remove plaintiff from the ambit of federal prohibition or by extension, this section. 855 F.3d 1067 (2017).

Defendant police chief was entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff firearm permit applicant's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims for monetary damages for alleged violations of plaintiff's Second Amendment right to bear arms and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process right because a reasonable official in defendant's circumstances would not have understood that defendant's conduct violated a right that was clearly established at the time of the denial of plaintiff's permit; this section, on which the denial was based, had not been invalidated by case or legislative action. 869 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (2012).

Plaintiff firearm permit applicant's allegations that plaintiff was denied a permit and ordered to surrender plaintiff's weapons due to a conviction of harassment under §711-1106 more than ten years before and that the conviction was not a crime of violence under subsection (b) or federal law for the purposes of prohibiting ownership or possession of firearms were sufficient to state a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for a violation of plaintiff's Second Amendment rights. 869 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (2012).

Genuine issue of material fact existed regarding: (1) whether plaintiff had been under counseling for addiction to, abuse of, or dependence upon a drug or intoxicating liquor; and (2) whether plaintiff had been "medically documented to be no longer adversely affected" by drugs or intoxicating liquor. As a result, plaintiff had not established a Second Amendment right to possess firearms. 976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).

Subsection (b) did not disqualify plaintiff from exercising plaintiff's Second Amendment rights because the court could not conclude that plaintiff's convictions for harassment constituted a crime of violence. 976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).

Where defendants argued that plaintiff was prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law because of the federal Lautenberg Amendment, which prohibits firearm ownership by any person who "has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence", plaintiff's convictions for harassment did not qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under federal law. 976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).

Where defendants asserted that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a lawsuit because plaintiff was precluded from obtaining firearms under this section, and, therefore, could not establish a violation of plaintiff's Second Amendment rights, police department's denial of plaintiff's application for a firearms permit, order to surrender firearms plaintiff possessed, and letter affirming the denial of the application constituted an "injury-in-fact" sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of Article III standing. 49 F. Supp. 3d 727 (2014).

Where plaintiff was disqualified from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) and applying subsection (a) would not have an impermissible retroactive effect, subsection (a) precluded plaintiff from acquiring a firearms permit. 49 F. Supp. 3d 727 (2014).

Felon convicted of possessing firearm properly sentenced under this section instead of §706-610. 68 H. 622, 725 P.2d 799 (1986).

Defendant exercised control when defendant sold gun. 70 H. 219, 768 P.2d 230 (1989).

Previously convicted felon must have intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly possessed or controlled the firearm. 70 H. 509, 778 P.2d 704 (1989).

Defendant may not assert the invalidity of the prior conviction as a defense under this section. 71 H. 101, 784 P.2d 867 (1989).

Convicted person may not assert the invalidity of the prior offense as a defense to this section. 71 H. 111, 784 P.2d 872 (1989).

Subsection (b) applies to felons who are convicted through a nolo contendere plea. 83 H. 507, 928 P.2d 1 (1996).

Where defendant's convictions were premised upon the use of "any firearm" and language of indictments and trial court's instructions "to wit, a semiautomatic pistol" did not alter the statutory elements of §§708-840, 134-6, or this section, trial court's error of not providing definition of "semiautomatic firearm" did not warrant reversal of convictions of first degree robbery, carrying or use of firearm in commission of separate felony, or felon in possession of firearm. 91 H. 33, 979 P.2d 1059 (1999).

For the purposes of subsection (b), "possession" must be analyzed using a two-pronged analysis: (1) the voluntary act of "possession" of an object "itself" is, by way of §702-202, satisfied where an individual acts knowingly with respect to his or her conduct; and (2) the requisite state of mind with respect to the attendant circumstances--i.e., the particular qualities of the object that make it illegal to possess it--is, by way of §702-204, satisfied by a reckless state of mind. 93 H. 87, 997 P.2d 13 (2000).

Where one bag containing a gun was found on truck seat next to defendant and another bag with two guns was found on truck floor where defendant had been sitting, jury could have inferred from totality of circumstances that defendant had the state of mind requisite to commit possession of a firearm and/or ammunition by a person convicted of certain crimes. 93 H. 87, 997 P.2d 13 (2000).

A person commits the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm, pursuant to §705-500(1)(b) and (3), and subsection (b), if he or she intentionally engages in conduct that, under the circumstances as he or she believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in his or her commission of the offense of prohibited possession of a firearm. 93 H. 199, 998 P.2d 479 (2000).

As the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm under this section does not include a result-of-conduct element and §705-500(2) does not therefore apply, trial court instruction erroneously defined the state of mind necessary to prove the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm as something less than intentional, as required by §705-500(1)(b). 93 H. 199, 998 P.2d 479 (2000).

Pursuant to §§701-109(4)(b), 705-500(1)(b) and (3), and subsection (b), attempted prohibited possession of a firearm is an included offense of prohibited possession of a firearm. 93 H. 199, 998 P.2d 479 (2000).

Where defendant failed to carry defendant's burden of establishing that defendant's conduct--of possessing ammunition in violation of subsection (b), a class B felony involving conduct that had the potential for serious public safety consequences--was de minimis within the meaning of §702-236, appellate court's dismissal of trial court's granting of motion to dismiss charges as a de minimis infraction under §702-236 affirmed. 123 H. 329, 235 P.3d 325 (2010).

Where the State's evidence only went so far as to show defendant's ownership and presence in the vehicle and defendant's proximity to the firearm and ammunition, absent evidence of intent, the circuit court correctly granted defendant's renewed motion of judgment of acquittal; the appeals court thus erred in vacating circuit court's judgment by concluding that there was sufficient evidence of intent for jury to infer that defendant constructively possessed the subject rifle and ammunition in violation of subsection (b). 128 H. 18, 282 P.3d 560 (2012).

Requisite state of mind for a violation of subsection (b) is that of acting intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; failure to instruct jury on state of mind element, as required by §701-114(1)(b), was prejudicial and not harmless error. 78 H. 422 (App.), 895 P.2d 173 (1995).

Where State failed to establish defendant's prior felony conviction and no lesser included offense of a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition in chapter 134, defendant's convictions of being a felon in possession of a firearm and firearm ammunition under subsection (b) reversed. 82 H. 517 (App.), 923 P.2d 934 (1996).

Under subsection (b), multiple punishments are not authorized for violating the prohibition against possession of "any firearm or ammunition therefor"; thus, where defendant was already convicted of possessing a firearm, defendant could not be convicted for possession of ammunition loaded into that firearm. 89 H. 59 (App.), 968 P.2d 1070 (1998).

Although evidence that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony was relevant for purposes of this section, evidence that defendant may have received ineffective assistance of counsel during that prior felony trial would not have any bearing on the validity of that felony conviction; thus, trial court did not err in precluding evidence that defendant may have received ineffective assistance during prior trial. 90 H. 489 (App.), 979 P.2d 85 (1999).

Unless expressly permitted by the court, subsection (f) unqualifiedly prohibits a person subject to a chapter 586 order from possession and control of a firearm during the pendency of that order; this prohibition is effective irrespective of whether the respondent owned the firearms involved. 91 H. 438 (App.), 984 P.2d 1264 (1999).

Trial court erred in sentencing defendant to ten years of incarceration with a mandatory minimum term of ten years under §706-660.1(3)(c) as convicting defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to subsection (b) and sentencing defendant to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment pursuant to §706-660.1(3)(c) essentially punished defendant twice for a single possession of a firearm; a rational interpretation of §706-660.1 is that the legislature did not intend its application for felonies where the entirety of the felonious conduct is the use or possession of a firearm. 107 H. 273 (App.), 112 P.3d 759 (2005).

In a prosecution of a felon under subsection (b) for possession of firearm ammunition, the State must prove, whether by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the ammunition was "actually loaded"; given detective's authoritative identification of the bullets as ammunition, and in the absence of evidence that the ammunition was not loaded or otherwise incapable of being fired, was substantial evidence that the ammunition was actually loaded. 108 H. 124 (App.), 117 P.3d 856 (2005).

Mentioned: 9 H. App. 333, 839 P.2d 1186 (1992).