§46-72  Liability for injuries or damages; notice.  Before the county shall be liable for damages to any person for injuries to person or property received upon any of the streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, or other public places of the county, or on account of any negligence of any official or employee of the county, the person injured, or the owner or person entitled to the possession, occupation, or use of the property injured, or someone on the person's behalf, within two years after the injuries accrued shall give the individual identified in the respective county's charter, or if none is specified, the chairperson of the council of the county or the clerk of the county in which the injuries occurred, notice in writing of the injuries and the specific damages resulting, stating fully when, where, and how the injuries or damage occurred, the extent of the injuries or damages, and the amount claimed. [L 1943, c 181, §1; RL 1945, §6013; RL 1955, §138-21; HRS §46-72; am L 1998, c 124, §1; am L 2007, c 152, §8]

Cross References

  Use, repair, and maintenance of public roads in ownership dispute, see §46-15.9.

Law Journals and Reviews

  The Requirement for Notice of Claim Against the City and County of Honolulu:  Does it Apply to a Claim for Contribution Under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act?  3 HBJ, May 1965, at 4.

Case Notes

  Presentation of claim against county within six month limit was not condition precedent to maintaining third party action against county for contribution under Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.  283 F. Supp. 854.

  This is a statute of limitations and is to be narrowly construed.  283 F. Supp. 854.

  Plaintiff's [chapters] 368 and 378 state law claims against the county were time-barred under this section, where plaintiff never provided the county written notice of plaintiff's claim.  504 F. Supp. 2d 969.

  Sufficiency of notice of claim discussed.  54 H. 210, 505 P.2d 1182.

  Notice of claim requirement is inconsistent with §662-4 and is invalid.  55 H. 216, 517 P.2d 51; 56 H. 135, 531 P.2d 648.

  Because the city is neither the sovereign nor the surrogate or alter ego of the sovereign, it is not entitled to sovereign immunity; thus, it is subject to the State's tort laws in the same manner as any private tortfeasor; as §657-13 governs classes of "personal" tort actions, such as "damage to persons or property", the infancy tolling provision of §657-13(1) applies directly to personal injury actions against the city; child was thus able to bring action, but as §657-13(1) did not provide for tolling of parents' derivative actions and they did not timely comply with this section, their individual claims were barred.  104 H. 341, 90 P.3d 233.

  Counties do not fall within the ambit of the State Tort Liability Act, chapter 662; this section is the statute of limitations applicable to actions against the counties.  104 H. 341, 90 P.3d 233.

  The limitation period set forth in this section is not tolled pending the appointment of a personal representative.  115 H. 1, 165 P.3d 247.

  The statute of limitations applicable to the estate's claims arising out of decedent's injuries and the plaintiff's own derivative wrongful death damages was this section; this section applies to claims against counties arising from fatal injuries.  115 H. 1, 165 P.3d 247.

  Where this section (2006) created a class of tort claimants, injured by the conduct of a county, who were subject to a six-month statute of limitations period for filing their complaint, and victims of injuries caused by the State under §662-4 had a two-year limitation period, and there was no rational basis to support such disparate treatment, this section (2006) was unconstitutional under article I, §5 of the Hawaii constitution.  115 H. 1, 165 P.3d 247.

  Statutory notice prerequisite was satisfied, where upon decedent's death, plaintiffs sent a letter to the county chief of police and corporation counsel requesting that all evidence related to the accident be preserved, such as the decedent's bicycle that was struck by a police vehicle.  Despite the county's argument that the letter was insufficient notice of an actual claim, although not technically filed with the county clerk, it provided notice to the appropriate county officials.  Thus, the county suffered no prejudice in its ability to investigate or prepare for litigation due to any faults in the written notice.  379 F. Supp. 3d 1086 (2019).